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As I WRITE,  the U.S. economy remains  mired  in the slowest recovery 
from any recession in the postwar period. Consumer  confidence and 
consumption spending, in particular,  have been exceptionally weak, 
and the unemployment  rate has continued  to rise long after  many  other 
indicators  began to improve. This paper presents evidence that these 
facts are  related,  in the sense that  consumer  pessimism  about  unemploy- 
ment  explains  a substantial  part  of the recent  weakness in consumption. 
However, neither  theoretical  consumption  models commonly  used for 
macroeconomic  research' nor standard  macroeconometric  forecasting 
models2  provide  a direct role for unemployment  expectations in deter- 
mining  current  consumption.3  By contrast, this paper shows that the 
"buffer-stock"  model of saving  that has evolved from the work of Ste- 
phen Zeldes and  Angus Deaton and  from  my previous  work  can imply  a 
central  role  for unemployment  expectations.4  In the buffer-stock  model, 
I am  grateful  to Angus  Deaton,  Robert  Hall, Miles  Kimball,  Jennifer  Manning,  Edwin 
Sanders, Lawrence Summers, David Wilcox, Stephen Zeldes, the members of the 
Brookings  Panel,  and  participants  in seminars  at the Federal  Reserve  Board,  the National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research,  the University  of Pennsylvania,  and the Bank of Italy. 
Remaining  errors  are my own. The views expressed in this paper  are my own and do 
not necessarily  reflect the opinions  of the Federal  Reserve Board. 
1. Specifically,  I have in mind  the certainty-equivalence  model  used in different  ways 
by Flavin  (1981),  Campbell  (1987),  Campbell  and  Mankiw  (1989),  and  many  others. 
2. See, for example,  the MIT-Penn  Social Science Research  Center  (MPS)  model of 
the consumption  sector. See Fuhrer  (1992)  for a description. 
3. In the certainty  equivalence  model, only the future  level of income  affects the cur- 
rent  level  of consumption.  Although  income  and  unemployment  are  likely  to be correlated, 
once expected income is controlled  for, the model implies  that there is no independent 
influence  of the unemployment  rate  on consumption. 
4. Zeldes  (1989a),  Deaton  (1991),  and  Carroll  (1992). 
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consumers  hold assets mainly  so that  they can shield  their  consumption 
against unpredictable  fluctuations  in income; unemployment  expecta- 
tions are therefore  important  because typically  the most drastic  fluctua- 
tions in a household's  income are those associated with spells of unem- 
ployment. 
Buffer-stock  saving  behavior  can emerge  from  the standard  dynamic 
optimization  framework  when consumers  facing important  income un- 
certainty  are both impatient,  in the sense that if income were certain, 
they would like to borrow  against  future  income to finance  current  con- 
sumption,  and  prudent, in Miles Kimball's  sense that they have a pre- 
cautionary  saving  motive.5  The  buffer-stock  behavior  arises  because  im- 
patience makes consumers want to spend down their assets,  while 
prudence  makes  them  reluctant  to draw  down  assets too far. In my 1992 
paper,  I showed that  under  plausible  circumstances  this tension  will im- 
ply the existence of a target  wealth stock.6  If wealth  is below the target, 
fear (prudence)  will dominate  impatience  and the consumer  will try to 
save, while if wealth  is above the target,  impatience  will  be stronger  than 
fear and consumers  will plan to dissave. Unemployment  expectations 
are important  in this model  because when consumers  become more  pes- 
simistic  about  unemployment,  their  uncertainty  about  future  income  in- 
creases, so their target  buffer-stock  increases, and they increase their 
saving  to build  up wealth  toward  the new target. 
The model is structurally  similar  to that  of Stephen  Zeldes7;  the main 
formal difference is the buffer-stock model's assumption that con- 
sumers  are impatient.  Even more similar  is Angus Deaton's model, ex- 
cept that Deaton imposes liquidity  constraints,  while the model in this 
paper does not.8 Indeed, the term "buffer-stock"  saving is borrowed 
from Deaton's description  of his own model, and in practical  terms I 
view the two models as relatively close substitutes. However, while 
Deaton did not treat unemployment  in his model, the simulation  evi- 
5. Kimball  (1990a).  The theory described  in this paper  is not directly  related  to the 
buffer-stock  model of liquidity  preference  developed, for example, by Cuthbertson  and 
Barlow  (1991).  Their  model  is largely  an econometric  framework  for analyzing  aggregate 
consumption  data,  and  is not based  on the solution  to a consumer's  optimization  problem. 
Nonetheless, much  of the empirical  evidence  they provide  can be interpreted  as support- 
ive of the model  presented  here. 
6. Carroll  (1992). 
7. Zeldes  (1989a). 
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dence presented here suggests that unemployment  expectations are 
probably  a crucial  factor in determining  the amount  and characteristics 
of buffer-stock  saving. 
The next part  of this paper  is devoted to analyzing  the nature  and de- 
gree  of uncertainty  households  face, so that  the model  can be parameter- 
ized and solved. Using household data from the University of Michi- 
gan's Panel  Study of Income Dynamics  (PSID), I find a high degree of 
income uncertainty;  in particular,  I find that households occasionally 
experience very bad outcomes in which their  income drops essentially 
to zero.9 The third section of the paper solves the buffer-stock  model 
using these uncertainty  estimates and explores some of the model's 
properties.  Simulations  show that, even with unchanging  expectations 
about  the average  future  level of income, changes  in the expected proba- 
bility of "bad events" (interpreted  as unemployment)  have a major  im- 
pact on current  consumption  and saving. This section also shows that 
in the buffer-stock  model (in contrast  to permanent-income  models)  the 
elasticity  of saving  with respect  to the growth  rate  of income is positive. 
Furthermore,  while standard  life-cycle and permanent-income  models 
imply  that the interest  elasticity of saving should  be strongly  positive,10 
in the buffer-stock  model the interest elasticity of saving is approxi- 
mately  zero. Both these results  arise because of the target-saving  char- 
acter  of the model. 
The fourth section provides a variety of macroeconomic  evidence 
that supports the buffer-stock  model, as well as some evidence that 
documents  an apparent  limitation  of the model. The model is shown to 
be  capable of  explaining the  "consumption/income  parallel" that 
Lawrence  Summers  and  I found  in our 1991  paper.  1i The model  can also 
explain  evidence that shows that consumers  express a greater  desire to 
save, and actually save more, in periods when fears of unemployment 
are high or rising, even  controlling for expectations about income 
growth. The model has somewhat  greater  difficulty  explaining  a nega- 
tive short-term  correlation  between consumption  growth and unem- 
ployment  expectations, but I argue  that the empirical  results would be 
roughly  consistent with the model  if consumption  adjusts  slowly, rather 
than  instantaneously,  to changes  in unemployment  expectations. 
9.  University of Michigan, A Panel Study of Income Dynamics,  Wave XVIII. 
10. See, for example,  Summers  (1981). 
11. Carroll  and  Summers  (1991). 64  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
The fifth  section uses the theoretical  and  empirical  results  of the pre- 
vious sections to analyze two puzzles: the secular decline of the per- 
sonal saving  rate  in the United States over the last two decades, and  the 
surprising  weakness  of consumption  growth  in the past year  or two. The 
last section of the paper  indicates  directions  for future  research. 
Estimates of Income Uncertainty from the PSID 
Unfortunately,  most existing  microeconomic  studies  of the structure 
of changes in income are not useful for characterizing  the uncertainty 
facing  consumers  in a standard  life-cycle/permanent-income  hypothesis 
(LC/PIH)  model because they concentrate  on inappropriate  data sam- 
ples and  inappropriate  measures  of income.  12  I therefore  made  new esti- 
mates using the PSID, which has data  for a large sample  of households 
for the years 1968-85. 
The most natural  way to link  the PSID  data  to a model  of consumption 
is to identify  the PSID "household"  as the decision unit  and  to examine 
variability  in household  income. The appropriate  measure  of income  for 
solving the model below is total family noncapital  income, which in- 
cludes transfer  payments such as unemployment  insurance,  disability 
compensation,  alimony, and social security payments, as well as non- 
capital  income  earned  by household  members  other  than  the head. In all 
of the analyses  below, the sample  will consist of households  in which  the 
same individual  was head of the household over the entire period;  the 
head was older than 24 and younger  than 63 years old over the entire 
sample  period;  and  the household  was not part  of the PSID poverty sub- 
sample.13 The sample will also sometimes be restricted to heads of 
12. In particular,  MaCurdy  (1982) and Abowd and Card (1989), two widely cited 
sources  on micro-level  income  changes,  restrict  their  samples  to individuals  whose  income 
neither  falls  to zero nor  rises too much,  eliminating  at a stroke  the consumers  who experi- 
ence the  greatest  income  variability.  Their  focus on labor  income  of the head  of household, 
on the other hand,  exaggerates  the variability  of total noncapital  income  because unem- 
ployment  insurance,  disability  payments,  and  labor  market  participation  by other  house- 
hold  members  can all act to reduce  the variation  in total  family  income. 
13. Participants  in the PSID  consist  of two groups:  a random  probability  sample  of the 
population  as a whole, and  a special  subsample  chosen  to study  poor  people. If the behav- 
ior of the poverty  subsample  differs  systematically  from  that  of the rest of the population, 
then  results  could be biased  by including  this subsample  in the analysis.  Thus  I excluded 
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households  whose marital  status  never changed  or who were never self- 
employed.  Restrictions  like these will eliminate  important  sources of in- 
come uncertainty,  but in general  it is best to err  on the side of underesti- 
mating  uncertainty.  If true  uncertainty  is larger  than  estimated,  most of 
the results  of the latter  portion  of the paper  would  only be strengthened. 
To solve the models below, I will describe  the process that  generates 
total  family  noncapital  income YL  ("labor  income" for short)  by the fol- 
lowing  equation: 
(1)  YL, =  P, Vt, 
where Vt  is a multiplicative  transitory  shock in year t and  P, is "perma- 
nent labor  income" in year t, the value of labor  income if no transitory 
shocks occur (V, =  1). Note that  this definition  of "permanent  labor  in- 
come" does not correspond  to the common modern interpretation  in 
which permanent  income is some function of the present discounted 
value of all expected future  labor  income. This definition  of P, does cor- 
respond, however, fairly closely to what Milton Friedman  himself ap- 
peared  to mean  by permanent  income. Friedman  writes: 
The permanent  component  [depends  on] . ..  the nonhuman  wealth [the unit] 
owns; the personal  attributes  of the earners  in the unit, such as their  training, 
ability,  personality;  the attributes  of the economic activity of the earners,  such 
as the occupation  followed, the location  of the economic  activity,  and  so on. It is 
analogous to the "expected"  value of a probability  distribution.  The transitory 
component  is to be interpreted  as reflecting  all "other"  factors, factors  that  are 
likely to be treated by the unit affected as "accidental" or "chance" occur- 
rences.  14 
The log of P will be assumed  to follow a random  walk with drift: 
(2)  Pt+I =  GP,N,+  ,orlnPt+I  =  lnG + lnPt  + lnN,+1, 
where G is the growth  factor  for permanent  income, and  N, is period  t's 
multiplicative  shock to permanent  labor  income. 
The goal of this section is to characterize  the distributions  of Vt  and 
N,, the transitory  and  permanent  shocks, respectively. Most of the data 
will be approximately  consistent with the assumption  that V,  and  N, are 
distributed  lognormally.  The lower tail of the income distribution,  how- 
14. Friedman  (1957,  p. 21). Italics  added. 66  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
ever, is not well captured  by the assumption  of lognormality,  and  there- 
fore must  be examined  separately. 
Characterizing  the Lower  Tail 
As a first  step toward  understanding  the structure  of the income  data, 
detrended  noncapital  income YLi,  was calculated  for each household  i in 
each year t over the 1976-85  period  for which noncapital  income can be 
calculated.15 For  each household,  an average  level of permanent  income 
YL,  was constructed,  equal to the average  value of YLi,  over the 1976- 
85 period. Finally, a variable  YLRATIOi, =  YLj,IYL,  was created. This 
generated  ten observations  for each household,  and sample  restrictions 
narrowed  the sample  to 1,238  households, yielding  a total of 12,380  ob- 
servations  of YLRATIO.  Figure 1 presents  two histograms.  The top fig- 
ure plots the YLRATIO  for the entire sample, while the bottom figure 
magnifies  the lower portion  of the histogram  and illustrates  that a sub- 
stantial concentration  of observations occurs at approximately  zero 
income.  16 
The observations  near zero income do not appear  to be drawn  from 
the same distribution  generating  the rest of the histogram.  This encour- 
ages the belief that  the total distribution  can be generated  by combining 
a process that occasionally  generates  zero income with a well-behaved 
process that operates  whenever  income is not zero. Previous  research- 
ers have sometimes  argued  that  observations  of near-zero  income  reflect 
measurement  error  and  hence should  be excluded  from  analysis.  Inspec- 
tion of the raw data, however, shows that, at least for the consumers 
15. The detrending  procedure  was as follows. In each year, mean  weighted  family  in- 
come was calculated  for the whole sample,  and "detrended"  household  income  for each 
household  was defined  as the  ratio  of actual  household  income  to the  mean.  This  procedure 
removes  common  movements  in  income  across  all  households,  including  both  cyclical  and 
secular  trend  effects. The next step was to remove  predictable  life-cycle  movements  from 
income.  An equation  was estimated  relating  detrended  income  to age, occupation,  educa- 
tion, and interactions  of these terms. This equation  was then used to predict  income in 
each  year  for  each  household.  Detrended  income  from  the  first  procedure  was  then  divided 
by predicted  income  for each household,  generating  the YL  series  used in the calculations 
above. This second procedure  should have removed  changes in income that were due 
purely  to the  predictable  effects  of aging.  Results  were  basically  the same  as those  reported 
using  a variety  of other  procedures  for removing  aggregate  and  life-cycle  trends. 
16. There  were  a few observations  of negative  noncapital  income,  but  only  among  self- 
employed  households.  These observations  were counted  as zero-income  observations. Christopher D.  Carroll  67 
Figure 1.  Distribution of YLRATIO 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  based  on data  from  the University  of Michigan,  Panel Survey  of Income  Dynamics 
(PSID),  as described  in the text. Observations  are equal  to the number  of households  multiplied  by the number  of 
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Table 1. The Number  of Times  Family  Noncapital  Income  Falls to Zero 
Total  Number  of  Percent of 
number  of  near-zero  near-zero 
Heads of household  observations  events  events 
Full sample  12,380  81  0.65 
No self-employed  10,674  39  0.37 
No change  in marital  status  11,934  73  0.61 
No self-employed  or change 
in marital  status  10,281  31  0.30 
Source: Author's  calculations  using  University  of Michigan,  A Panel  Study of Income  Dynamics  (PSID).  See text 
for definition  of various  samples. 
who are not self-employed,  some event such as unemployment,  injury, 
or health  problems  usually  occurred  in the same period  as, or  just prior 
to, the near-zero  event. Furthermore,  in a careful  study  of errors  in labor 
survey data, Greg  Duncan  and Daniel Hill found  that outlying  observa- 
tions on annual  income generally  correspond  to actual  extreme experi- 
ences of the respondent,  not to measurement  error.  17 
Table 1  counts the number  of near-zero  income  events when the sam- 
ple is restricted  in various  ways, where a near-zero  event is defined  as a 
value of YLRATIO  of less than 0.1 (noncapital  income less than 10  per- 
cent of its average  over the period).  In the unrestricted  sample  of 12,380 
observations,  81 near-zero  events occur. If near-zero  income  events are 
independent  and  transitory  and  if all consumers  are  identical,  this means 
that each consumer  has about a 0.65 percent chance of experiencing  a 
near-zero  event'8 in any given year.'9  This figure  is reduced when the 
sample  is restricted  to heads of households  who were not self-employed 
or to those who did  not experience  any change  in marital  status  over the 
period, but it is not clear that such sample  restrictions  are appropriate. 
17. Duncan  and  Hill  (1985). 
18. The  fraction  of near-zero  events  for nontransfer  labor  income  of the head  of house- 
hold  was far higher,  on the order  of 3 to 4 percent  of the sample.  Thus  including  transfer 
income  and  spouse's  income  greatly  reduces  the incidence  of near-zero  events. 
19. The information  presented  so far does not rule out the possibility  that when a 
household's  income  drops  to near  zero, it stays near  zero, or, less dramatically,  it reverts 
to a much  lower level than  before. Investigation  of this question,  however, showed that 
when the sample  excludes the self-employed  and  people experiencing  changes  in marital 
status, income typically recovers fully from near-zero  events within three years, and 
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In light  of these results, the model  below will assume  that the near-zero 
events are transitory  shocks which occur with a probability  of 0.5 per- 
cent each period. 
Characterizing the Distributions  When Income  Does  Not 
Go to Zero 
The relative  magnitudes  of the transitory  and  permanent  components 
of shocks when income does not go to zero now must be determined.20 
Recent work in the macroeconometric  literature  has illustrated  the dif- 
ficulties  of decomposing  univariate  time series into transitory  and per- 
manent components; however, under sufficiently  strong conditions it 
can be done. It turns  out that the assumptions  needed to solve the theo- 
retical  model  below are  also strong  enough  to generate  a unique  variance 
decomposition between permanent  and transitory  shocks. These as- 
sumptions  are that the shocks to income are serially uncorrelated  and 
independent  at all leads and  lags. 
In addition to the sample limitations  discussed above, the sample 
used for the transitory/permanent  decomposition  was further  limited  to 
heads of households whose marital  status did not change;  who did not 
experience a  near-zero income event;  and who  were  never self- 
employed.  All three  exclusions should  reduce  measured  variability  rela- 
tive to true variability.  Figure  2 presents  a histogram  of the distribution 
of the first  differences  in ln YLi,  in this sample, along with a reasonably 
well-fitting  normal  distribution  whose parameters  were estimated  from 
the data.  Based on the results  of figure  2, 1 will assume  that  both  the tran- 
sitory  and  the permanent  shocks are  lognormally  distributed,  producing 
the approximately  lognormal  distribution  of annual  innovations.2' 
Under  the strong  assumptions  that  have been made, the methodology 
for recovering  the transitory  and permanent  components  of the shocks 
is simple  (and  is essentially  the same  as the methodology  used by Robert 
20. See below for a discussion  of measurement  error  as a possible source  of some of 
the measured  innovations  in income. 
21. To the  extent  that  the normal  distribution  does not  fit  the histogram,  it is principally 
due to the excessively fat tails in the true  distribution.  This means  that  assuming  lognor- 
mality  again  errs  on the side of minimizing  the importance  of uncertainty,  because  lognor- 
mality  underrepresents  draws  in the  lower  tail  of the income  distribution,  which  are  dispro- 
portionately  influential  in producing  precautionary  behavior. 70  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Figure  2. Distribution  of Annual  Innovations  in Log Family  Noncapital  Income 
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Source: Author's  calculations  based  on data  from  PSID  as described  in the text. 
a.  Observations  are equal to the number of households  multiplied by the number of years in the sample period. 
b.  Size  of innovation  is defined as the first differences  in the log of detrended  noncapital income. 
Hall and Frederic  Mishkin).22  Note that, defining  g  =  G -  1  in G, if 
income in future  periods  is compared  to income today, it follows that 
lnPt+m  m  lnPt  +  mg +  ln N+I + lnNt+2  +  .  + InNt+m 
ln YLt+m  -  ln  YL, =  (lnPt+m  +  ln  Vt+m) -  (lnPt  + ln  Vt) 
(ln  Pt + mg +  ln Nt,  +  ln  Nt+2  +  +  ln Vt+m) 
-  ln P,  -  ln Vt 
=  mg  +  lnN,1  +  ..  .  +  ln Nt+m +  ln Vt+m -  ln Vt. 
Because  it is assumed  that  ln Vi I In  V1  and  ln Ni I  ln N)  for all i =$  j and 
ln Vi  I ln  N1  for  all  i,  j, this  implies  that 
(3)  var (ln YL  -  ln YL,)  mglN  +  2 
Because ln YLt+m  -  ln YL,  can be calculated  for every household  i, 
there is a sample  on which to calculate  var (ln YLt+m  -  ln YL,)  for any t 
22. Hall  and  Mishkin  (1982). Christopher D.  Carroll  71 
Table  2. Size Estimates  of the Transitory  and Permanent  Components  of Income  Shocks 
Standard  deviation 
of innovationsb 
Definition  of income  Number  of  Transitory  Permanent 
and sample perioda  households  component  component 
Noncapital  family  income, 1976-85  834  0.163  0.126 
Total family  income, 1976-85  835  0.164  0.128 
Total family  income, 1968-85  398  0.155  0.113 
Labor  income of head, 1968-85  395  0.171  0.105 
Source: Author's  wldculations  using  PSID. 
a. The sample  is restricted  to households  whose "head"  experienced  no change  in marital  status,who  was never 
self-employed,  and who was between  the ages of 25 and 63 over the entire period. All these restrictions  reduce 
estimated  income  uncertainty.  The  sample  is also restricted  to households  that  did not experience  a near-zero  income 
event (that  is, observations  in which  income  was at least 10  percent  of its average  over the entire  sample  period). 
b. See text and appendix  for methodology  for calculating  the standard  deviation  of transitory  and permanent 
shocks. Reported  estimates  are robust  to MA(2)  serial  correlation  for the transitory  shocks. 
and  m that  remain  within  the 1976-85  sample  period.  For any two differ- 
ent values of m, it is possible to solve two linear  simultaneous  equations 
for  In N and  nv  . The first  section of the technical  appendix  shows how 
to generalize  this technique  to allow for MA(q)  serial correlation  in the 
transitory  shocks. 
Table  2 presents  the estimates  of  CJ2 N and r2n  v  for a variety  of samples 
and definitions  of income. (The reported  estimates  are robust  to MA(2) 
serial correlation  in the transitory  shocks; see the technical  appendix.) 
For the preferred  income definition,  total noncapital  income, the tech- 
nique estimates the standard  deviations of the annual innovations in 
both components to be approximately  0.15. Virtually  identical  results 
are obtained  using total (capital  and noncapital)  income over the 1976- 
85 period. 
Interpreted  literally, this would mean that every year, about one- 
third  of consumers  experience  positive or negative shocks to their  per- 
manent  income of greater  than 15 percent. Similarly,  each year about 
one-third  (but not the same one-third)  of consumers  experience transi- 
tory shocks of more  than 15  percent  in each year. These estimates  of the 
uncertainty  of income may seem surprisingly  high, but they are consis- 
tent with  estimates  obtained  by many  other  researchers.23  Some authors 
have speculated  that  measurement  error  may  account  for most of the an- 
nual innovations in income, but several empirical studies have con- 
23. The raw estimates of the annual  innovations  in labor income of the household 
head,  for instance,  are quite  close to estimates  obtained  by Abowd  and  Card  (1989). 72  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
cluded that most of the variation  in measured  earnings  corresponds  to 
true  variation.  John  Bound  and  Alan  B. Krueger,  for instance, conclude 
that around  70 percent of the variation  in their first-differenced  sample 
corresponds  to true variation  and not to measurement  error.24  Another 
strike  against  the view that most of the variation  in income is measure- 
ment  error  is the large  size of the estimated  permanent  component  of the 
annual  innovation.  It is hard  to see why measurement  error  would have 
a unit  root. 
In light  of these results, the income distribution  process assumed  for 
the rest of the paper  will be as follows. In each period,  there  is a 0.5 per- 
cent chance  of a transitory  shock that  causes income  to go to zero in that 
period. If income is not zero, shocks to both transitory  and permanent 
income are lognormally  distributed  with standard  deviations  JInv  = 
CJInN  =  0.10.  These numbers  are substantially  lower than suggested  by 
the data in order to compensate  for whatever measurement  error  may 
exist, and also because it seems better to understate,  rather  than over- 
state, income  uncertainty.  If, as below, precautionary  saving  effects are 
still  found  to be important,  the true  effects are  probably  larger  than  those 
estimated  using  conservative  measures  of uncertainty. 
The Basic Model 
This  section of the paper  summarizes  the characteristics  of the buffer- 
stock model originally  developed in my other 1992  paper.25  After for- 
mally  specifying  the model and choosing  parameter  values, I show why 
buffer-stock  behavior emerges from this framework.  I then consider 
how changing  various parameters  would affect the long-run  target  for 
wealth. Next I provide an example of the short-term  dynamic  reaction 
of consumption,  saving, and wealth to a change in the long-run  target. 
Finally, I discuss how the model would differ if explicit liquidity  con- 
straints  were imposed. 
Parameterizing  and Solving  the Model 
Consider  a standard  intertemporal  consumption  model: 
T 
(4)  max E E  Pt  u(C,),t 
t=o 
24. Bound  and  Krueger  (1989). 
25. Carroll  (1992). Christopher  D. Carroll  73 
such that  W =+  I  R(Wt +  YL, -  C,) 
YL, =  Pt V, 
Pt,+=  GPtN,+I, 
where YL,  P, V, and N are, as previously  defined, current  and perma- 
nent labor  income and their shocks; G =  1 + g, where G is the growth 
factor and g is the growth  rate; W is net wealth;  R =  1 + r, where r is 
the interest  rate  and  R is the interest  factor;  l  =  1/(1 + 8) is the discount 
factor, where  8 is the discount  rate;  and  C is consumption.  The standard 
Constant  Relative  Risk Aversion (CRRA)  utility  function  is of the form 
u(C) =  C'  -P/(1 -  p) where p is the coefficient  of relative risk aversion. 
I do not explore here the implications  of a model like that of Larry 
Epstein  and  Stanley  Zin  in which  the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitu- 
tion is allowed  to differ  from  the inverse  of the coefficient  of relative  risk 
26  aversion. 
It turns out that the optimal  consumption  rule in a model with both 
transitory  and permanent  shocks can be written as a relationship  be- 
tween the ratio  of consumption  to permanent  income, CIP, and  the ratio 
of gross wealth  X to permanent  income, X/P, where gross wealth  X is 
defined  as assets plus current  income:  X, = W,  +  YL,.  If lower  case vari- 
ables denote the upper case counterpart  normalized  by permanent  in- 
come, this means that the optimal  consumption  rule can be written  as 
c(x,). That is, the optimal  consumption  ratio is a function of the gross 
wealth  ratio  and  nothing  else.27 
The model can now be solved for the optimal  consumption  rule for 
arbitrary sets  of  parameter values.  The  uncertainty parameters 
estimated  in the previous  section are  p (zero  income) = 0.5 percent,  and 
UFln V =  Uln N  =  0. 10.  This  leaves the discount  factor 1, the interest  factor 
R, the income growth  factor G, and the coefficient  of relative  risk aver- 
sion p still to be chosen. 
Although  many  empirical  estimates  have placed  the value  of the coef- 
ficient of relative risk aversion p at 5 or greater,  such a value produces 
unreasonably  large amounts of precautionary  saving, even for con- 
sumers  who have a 10  percent  annual  discount  rate.28  After  some experi- 
26. Epstein  and  Zin  (1989). 
27. For  a proof,  see the second  part  of the appendix  or my 1992  paper  (Carroll,  1992). 
28. For  estimates  from  microeconomic  data,  see Mankiw  and  Zeldes  (1990). 74  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
mentation,  I settled on a value of 3 for the simulations  reported  in this 
paper. 
In order  to generate  buffer-stock  saving  behavior,  it is necessary  that 
consumers be impatient  in the sense that if they faced no income un- 
certainty,  they would want to borrow  against  their  future  income in or- 
der to consume more today. Making  the usual approximations  that r = 
ln R, g  ln G, and - 8  ln j,  it turns out that the condition that is 
required for consumeYs  to  exhibit impatience in this sense is  p  -I 
(r -  8) < g.29  To see why this is a necessary condition,  note first  that if 
income  were perfectly  certain,  the growth  rate  of consumption  would  be 
approximately p  - I (r -  8).  30 Now consider a consumer with zero wealth 
and recall that the present discounted value (PDV) of consumption 
equals  the PDV of income. If consumption  is growing  more slowly than 
income but has the same PDV, the level of consumption  must  be higher 
than the level of income. (If consumption  were less than income and 
growing  more slowly, it clearly would have a lower (PDV.) Thus if in- 
come were certain and p - I (r -  8) < g, consumers would wish to spend 
more  than  income;  that  is, they would  wish to borrow. 
Impatience  is necessary because it limits the size of the net wealth 
that consumers will be willing to accumulate. The qualitative  results 
from  the buffer-stock  model  are similar  whether  consumers  wish to bor- 
row because they have high discount rates or because they have high 
expected growth  rates of income, but the base assumption  will be of a 
rather  high  discount  rate  of 10  percent  and a relatively  low expected in- 
come growth  rate  of 2 percent  annually.  Limited  results  will also be pre- 
sented for other  values of these parameters. 
The solution  method,  described  in the appendix,  involves solving  for 
the optimal  consumption  rule in the last period  of life, then the optimal 
rule in the second-to-last  period, then the third-to-last  period, and so 
29. p-' (r -  8) < g is a necessary  condition  but, I believe, not a sufficient  condition  for 
generating  buffer-stock  behavior.  I believe that the necessary  and sufficient  condition  is 
that p-  (r -  8) +  p/U2 InN  <  g; this is the condition  that Deaton (1991)  derives  for his 
model, which  is similar  to the model  presented  here, but  which  contains  explicit  liquidity 
constraints.  However, I have been unable  to prove  rigorously  that  this condition  is suffi- 
cient to guarantee  the emergence  of buffer-stock  saving  behavior. 
30. To derive this formally,  note that the Euler equation  is u' (C,) =  PR u' (C,+ ), 
implying (C,)-P =  PR (C,+ 1)-P,  implying C,+ /Ct =  (PR)'/P.  Taking logs of both sides gives 
ln  C,+  -  ln  C,  =  p- (lnR  +  n P)  p- (r  -  8). Christopher D.  Carroll  75 
Figure  3. Optimal  Consumption  Rules  According  to Years  of Life Remaining 
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Source: Author's  calculations  as described  in the text. The end  of life is 1T.  The ratio  of consumption  to permanent 
income  Is c. The gross wealth  ratio,  x, is the ratio  of gross wealth  to permanent  income. 
forth, until the difference between successive consumption rules is 
small  enough  that the consumption  rule can be said to have converged. 
Optimal  consumption  rules at selected ages under  the base parameter 
assumptions  are presented  in figure  3. Note that, under  the specific set 
of assumptions and parameter  values chosen here, the optimal con- 
sumption  rules converge rapidly:  the difference  between the consump- 
tion rules ten years before  the end of life and  forty-nine  years  before  the 
end of life is almost invisible. What  this means is that the behavior  of 
consumers  more  than  ten years from  the end of life is virtually  the same 
whether  they have eleven years of life remaining  or fifty.3' 
The fact that the consumption  rules converge so quickly  appears  to 
support  Hall's assertion  that there is little practical  difference  between 
the implications  of a "life-cycle" model in which consumers  face death 
in a finite number  of periods and the implications  of a "permanent- 
31. See Carroll  (1992)  for more  results  from  the model  over a finite  lifetime. 76  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
income" model in which there is an infinite  horizon.32  To some extent, 
however, this conclusion  depends  on the parameter  values chosen here. 
A particularly  interesting  point is that if consumers  face an income pro- 
file with rapid growth early in life followed by slower growth (or de- 
clines) later  in life, it is possible that  they might  switch  from  buffer-stock 
saving  behavior  when young  to more  traditional  life-cycle saving  behav- 
ior as retirement  approaches.  Intuitively,  this is because when they are 
young they face a high income growth  rate so they are impatient  in the 
p-I  (r -  8) < g sense, but as g falls with age, eventually they reach a 
point  where  they are  no longer  impatient  in this sense. In my 1992  paper, 
I explore this possibility in greater  detail, but for the purposes of this 
paper I will only consider "permanent-income"  consumers who face 
the same consumption  rule and income process every year into the in- 
definite  future.33 
Why Does  Buffer-Stock  Saving Behavior Arise in this Model? 
The intuition  for how the model  generates  buffer-stock  saving  behav- 
ior is given by considering  the Euler  equation  for consumption  growth. 
If shocks to consumption  are lognormally  distributed,  it can be shown 
that  consumption  will grow according  to 
(S)  A In C+  -  p-1 (r -  8) + 
I 
pE, var (A In C,  + ) +  e,. 
The key insight here is that the expected variance of consumption 
growth, E, var(A ln C,+),  will be negatively related to wealth. Intu- 
itively, consumers  with less wealth have less ability  to buffer  consump- 
tion against  income shocks; thus they have higher  E, var (A  ln C,+  I)  and 
faster  consumption  growth.  (The  third  part  of the technical  appendix  de- 
rives this result  formally.)  The growth  rate of consumption  is high  when 
wealth is small  because the level of consumption  is being depressed  by 
precautionary  saving. Kimball  showed that  for utility  functions  such as 
the one considered here, precautionary  saving declines as wealth in- 
creases.34  Therefore,  over time, as precautionary  saving  adds  to wealth, 
32. Hall  (1978). 
33. Carroll  (1992). 
34. Kimball  (1990a,  b). This  is true  for  utility  functions  that  exhibit  decreasing  absolute 
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consumption  will become less depressed. It is this lessening of precau- 
tionary saving as wealth increases that generates the extra growth in 
consumption  when E, var (A  ln C,+  I)  is high. 
Note that  in this model  lagged  income shocks will affect current  con- 
sumption  growth because lagged income shocks surely affect current 
wealth. Thus the legion of tests following Hall,3"  using both macroeco- 
nomic36  and microeconomic37  data that claim to reject the LC/PIH  be- 
cause lagged income growth predicts current  consumption  growth, do 
not constitute rejection  of general versions of the LC/PIH  framework 
that incorporate  precautionary  saving motives. In econometric terms, 
there is an omitted variable, the conditional  variance of consumption 
growth, which ought to  be  correlated with the  lagged change in 
income.38 
The obvious argument  is that a positive shock to income in the last 
period implies higher  wealth both in the last period and in this period, 
which in turn  implies  a higher  level of consumption  in both periods  and 
a lower growth  rate of consumption  between periods. This would pre- 
dict that regressions  of consumption  growth  on lagged  income changes 
would find a negative coefficient, as Zeldes found.39  However, regres- 
sions using macroeconomic  data typically  find  a positive coefficient  on 
lagged  income changes. This could be justified if rapid  income growth 
occurs  in periods  when  wealth  is low. For  instance,  the periods  of fastest 
income growth might be in the early stages of recovery when buffer 
stocks have been depleted by recession. In this case, the model might 
predict  a positive coefficient  on lagged  income changes. 
Figure 4 attempts to provide some intuition  about how the buffer- 
stock model works by showing the relationship between the gross 
35. Hall  (1978). 
36. See, for example,  Flavin  (1981). 
37. See, for example,  Zeldes  (1989b). 
38. Note that  the relevant  variable  is the conditional  variance  of consumption  growth 
at the household  level. There  is little  reason  to expect that  this will be related  to the condi- 
tional  variance  of aggregate  consumption  growth.  Hence, there is little reason  to expect 
success from  simple  attempts  to remedy  previous  tests of the Euler  equation  by, say, esti- 
mating  an  ARCH  process  for  the variance  of aggregate  consumption  growth  and  including 
predicted  aggregate  variance  on the right  hand  side. Some more  direct  measure  of house- 
hold  consumption  uncertainty  is necessary.  In the fourth  section  of this paper,  I argue  that 
unemployment  expectations  may  be an appropriate  proxy. 
39. Zeldes  (1989b). 78  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
Figure  4. The Buffer-Stock  Relationship  between  Growth  Rates  and the Gross 
Wealth  Ratio 
Growth  rates  of income  and  consumption 
g 
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Source: Author's  calculations  as described  in the text. Arrows  represent  convergence  toward  the "target"  wealth 
ratio.  Gross wealth  ratio  is the ratio  of gross wealth  to permanent  income.  The minimum  possible  amount  of gross 
wealth  is h. The expected  consumption  growth  next period  is E, A In C,+ . The target  wealth  on hand  is x*. The 
perfect  certainty  growth  rate  of consumption  is p -  (r -  8). The growth  rate  of income  is g. 
wealth  ratio,  expected consumption  growth,  and  income  growth.40  Con- 
sumers  are impatient  in the sense described  above: g > p'-l (r -  8). The 
line with arrows  traces out the relation  between expected consumption 
growth  in the next period, E, A ln C,  I, and gross wealth in the current 
period, x,. As x, approaches its minimum  possible level h,  expected 
consumption growth approaches infinity. This is  because as gross 
wealth  x, approaches  h, C, must approach  zero (see the next paragraph 
for arguments  demonstrating  this point). Because the expected level of 
Ct+  I is positive even if the consumer  enters  period  t + 1 with no assets, 
it follows that as x, approaches  h, E, A ln C,+ approaches  infinity.  On 
the other hand, as x, approaches  infinity,  uncertainty  about  future  labor 
40. Figure  4, and  much  of the following  discussion,  draw  upon  work  in my 1992  paper 
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income becomes essentially irrelevant to consumption because ex- 
pected future  labor  income becomes infinitesimal  in relation  to current 
wealth. Thus as x, approaches  infinity,  the consumption  growth  rate  ap- 
proaches the growth  rate under  certainty, p-I (r -  8). Because every- 
thing  in the model  is continuous  and  monotonic,  the expected consump- 
tion growth  rate will cross the income growth  rate curve at one point. 
The gross wealth ratio  at this point will be called  x*, the "target"  gross 
wealth  ratio. 
The vertical  axis in figure  4 is drawn  at a place labeled  h. This  is meant 
to signify (the negative of) the minimum  possible present discounted 
value of future labor income. For example, if in each period the mini- 
mum possible value of labor income were some amount Y, then the 
worst possible outcome would be for income to equal Yin every future 
period.  If that  were to occur, the PDV of labor  income  would  be given  by 
YIr,  so h would be -  YIr.  Under the parameterization  described  earlier 
in the paper,  a chance exists that  labor  income could go to zero,  in each 
future  year, so in this case, h =  Y = 0. This implies  that  consumers  will 
never borrow on net, even though there are no formal liquidity con- 
straints.41 To see why, consider a consumer in the second-to-last  pe- 
riod.42  If that consumer  saved nothing  and entered the last period with 
zero wealth, there  would be some possibility  of earning  zero income in 
the last period,  in which case consumption  would  be zero. Because con- 
sumption  of zero yields negative infinite  utility, no consumer  will ever 
allow himself to enter the last period of life with zero wealth-con- 
sumers  will always save at least a little bit to ensure  positive consump- 
tion. Now consider a consumer two periods from the end of life. A 
chance of earning  zero income exists in both the last and the second-to- 
last periods. The consumer in the third-to-last  period will therefore 
never allow himself  to enter the second-to-last  period  with zero assets. 
This logic can be applied  recursively  back to the first  period of life, so 
consumers  will never borrow. 
Now suppose income cannot go all the way to zero. Perhaps  social 
insurance,  private  charities,  or other sources would provide  income of 
at least Y  > 0, even in the event of, say, total disability.  In the absence 
41. To be precise, net worth  will never be negative.  This therefore  does not rule out 
mortgages,  auto loans, and other  loans used to purchase  assets whose value exceeds the 
debt  used to purchase  them. 
42. The  following  repeats  arguments  in Zeldes  (1989a)  and  Schechtman  (1976). 80  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
of liquidity  constraints,  it is easy to show that  the implications  of such a 
model  would  be essentially  identical  to the model  just described,  except 
that the minimum  possible level of gross wealth h (the vertical axis in 
figure  4) would no longer  be zero, but would instead  equal -  YIr.  In this 
case, wealth  could  be negative,  but  never  less than -  YIr.  Thus  the exist- 
ence of a positive lower bound  on income does not change the qualita- 
tive characteristics  of the model, unless an additional  assumption of 
liquidity  constraints  is made. (See the final  part  of this section for a dis- 
cussion of how liquidity  constraints  change  the model.) 
Returning  to figure  4, the gross wealth  ratio  x* is a target  in the sense 
that, if actual gross wealth is below x*, the consumer will spend an 
amount  small  enough  so that  gross wealth will be expected to increase; 
however, if actual gross wealth is greater than x*, the consumer will 
spend enough so that expected gross wealth next period will decline 
(hence the arrows  on the expected growth  rate curve). Section D of the 
appendix  proves this for a simplified  case. Section E of the appendix 
proves that, if gross wealth is at the target  ratio, the expected growth 
rate of  consumption is  approximately equal to  the growth rate of 
income.43 
It is easy to use figure  4 to see how the model's results differ  under 
alternative  parameter  values. For instance,  increasing  g, the growth  rate 
of future income, will decrease the target  wealth stock by shifting  the 
intersection  with the E, Aln C, 1 curve left. This is a standard  effect; 
higher  future  income  results  in higher  current  consumption,  hence lower 
saving and lower wealth. Increasing the discount rate will shift p-I 
(r -  8) down; therefore  the E, Aln C,+ curve will also shift down, de- 
creasing  target  wealth. Increasing  the interest  rate will shift p ' (r -  8) 
up, nudging  E, Aln C,+ up and increasing  target  wealth. Increasing  the 
degree  of uncertainty  in income will increase the variance  of consump- 
tion  growth  for any level of wealth, directly  shifting  the  E, Aln  C, l1 curve 
up and increasing  target wealth. Increasing  the coefficient of relative 
risk  aversion  p  will have two effects. It will shift  the E, Aln  C,+ curve up 
43. Actual  gross wealth  for an individual  consumer,  of course, will be subject  to ran- 
dom shocks, and thus for any individual,  x,  may end up being either  closer to x* than 
x, was, or farther  away, depending  on next period's  random  draws  from  the uncertainty 
distributions.  Convergence  toward  x* happens  in the sense that, if a large  number  of con- 
sumers  with the same value of x, were considered,  average  x,  next period would be 
closer  to x* than  x, was. Christopher  D. Carroll  81 
as [p  var (Aln  C,  1)]  increases, tending  to increase  wealth (this is the di- 
rect effect  of increased  risk aversion).  It also will shift the p  -I  (r -  8) 
curve down, thus tending  to reduce wealth (this is the effect of a lower 
intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution). 
Figure 4 and the proofs in the appendix  relate consumption  to the 
gross wealth ratio  x* because the consumption  ratio  is a direct  function 
of the gross wealth ratio. Most of the remaining  analysis of the paper, 
however, is more  easily performed  using the net wealth  ratio  w =  WIP. 
In particular,  it will be useful to define  the target  net wealth-to-income 
ratio w* as w* = x* -  1. This is justified by the fact that gross wealth is 
X =  W +  YL;  dividing through by P, x =  w +  V. Because  the expected 
value of the transitory  factor V is one (by definition),  it is sensible to de- 
fine the target net wealth ratio as w* = x* -  1. 
One reason  it is useful to define  w* is that  a simple  relationship  exists 
between w*  and  the personal  saving  rate. If w* = W*/P  is to remain  con- 
stant, net wealth W must be growing  at the same rate g as permanent 
income P. If the interest rate were zero, for W*  to grow at rate g, the 
consumer  would have to save an amount  gW*. Dividing  the amount  of 
saving by the level of permanent  labor income, P, yields the personal 
saving rate out of labor income at the target net wealth ratio, so that 
s*  gw*. Because the net wealth ratio  will tend toward  w* in a buffer- 
stock model, the personal saving rate will tend to approach  gw* over 
time. The last section of the appendix  shows that even with a positive 
interest  rate, the personal  saving  rate at the target  net wealth-to-income 
ratio will be well approximated by s*  gw*. 
Table  3 gives some quantitative  results  on how w* differs  under  a va- 
riety of parameter  values. Starting  with the sensitivity  of w* to the prob- 
ability  of zero-income  events, the first  column  of table  3 presents  values 
for w*  as p (zero  income)  varies  from  0.  1 percent  to 1  percent  annually.44 
At p = 0.1 percent  annually,  the target  buffer  stock is 26 percent  of an- 
nual  income;  at  p = 0.5 percent, it is 44 percent  of income;  and  at p =  1 
percent,  it is 56 percent  of income, as seen in the last column  of table 3. 
Very  bad  events clearly  have a powerful  effect on saving  behavior,  even 
44. If the distributions  of the transitory  and  permanent  shocks remained  the same as 
the probability  of zero-income  events changed, mean expected income would change. 
This effect was offset by increasing  the mean  of the transitory  distribution  by an amount 
such that expected income  in the next period  is the same  for all values of the probability 
of zero-income  events. 82  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
when the events are as rare  as those considered  here. This strongly  sug- 
gests that  it is important  to include  some treatment  of unemployment  in 
any buffer-stock  type model of precautionary  saving.45 
The next two columns  of the table show how w* differs  under  values 
of Cul  V and CulN ranging  from  0 percent  annually  to 15  percent  annually.46 
In comparison  with the effect of changing  p (zero income), changing  the 
variance  of either  transitory  or permanent  income shocks has compara- 
tively modest  effects.47 
The fourth  column  of the table  presents  the results  as the real  interest 
rate is increased  from 0 percent  to 2 percent  to 4 percent  annually.  The 
target  net wealth-to-income  ratio  is barely  affected  by the interest  rate, 
moving from 0.44 at r =  0 percent to 0.53 at r = 4 percent annually. Note 
that this implies  that the long-term  elasticity of the personal  saving  rate 
with respect to the interest rate is approximately  zero. In contrast, 
Summers  showed that the life-cycle model implies a strongly  positive 
interest elasticity of saving;48  the permanent  income model implies an 
even stronger  positive elasticity. This prediction  has been something  of 
an embarrassment  for the LC/PIH model because empirical  estimates 
of the interest  elasticity of saving  have typically  been quite small.49  The 
empirical  failure  has been particularly  acute over the last decade, when 
real  interest  rates  have been very high  and  personal  saving  has been very 
low. 
Results are also presented  for different  values of the discount rate, 
the growth  rate  of income, and  the coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  p. 
A choice of p =  1 (log utility)  generates a target  net wealth-to-income 
45. The argument  could be made that the treatment  here is excessively stylized. A 
more  realistic  model  might  be a compromise  between  Deaton's  model  (1991)  and  the model 
described  here. If income  could  drop  to, say, 40 or 50 percent  of its previous  level, but  did 
so with  a probability  of, say, 5 percent  (to approximate  the true  incidence  ofjob loss), one 
might  well obtain  results  similar  to those produced  here. However, I have not performed 
such simulations. 
46. The distributions  for the transitory  and  permanent  shocks were  truncated  at three 
standard  deviations  from  the mean. 
47. Because  these transitory  and  permanent  shocks  are lognormal  rather  than  normal 
distributions,  increasing  the variance  slightly  increases  the mean  level of the variable.  This 
increase  in the mean  level was sterilized  by reducing  the mean  of the lognormal  distribu- 
tions by an amount  sufficient  to keep the mean  levels the same as before  the increase  in 
variance. 
48. Summers  (1981). 
49. Carroll  and  Summers  (1991). Christopher  D. Carroll  83 
Table  3. Target  Net Wealth  Ratios  with Alternative  Parameter  Values 
Parameter  valuea 
Standard  Standard 
deviation  deviation  Coefficient 
of  of  of relative 
Probability  transitory  permanent  Real  risk  Target 
of zero  shocks,  shocks,  interest  Growth  Discount  aversion,  wealth-to- 
income, p  gInV  ?InN  rate, r  rate, g  rate, 6  p  income 
(0.5)b  (0.  10)  (0.10)  (0.0)c  (2,0)d  (10.0)e  (3.0)  ratio 
0.1  0.26 
0.5  0.44 
1.0  0.56 
0.00  0.42 
0.10  0.44 
0.15  0.46 
0.00  0.39 
0.10  0.44 
0.15  0.57 
0.0  0.44 
2.0  0.48 
4.0  0.53 
0.0  0.60 
2.0  0.44 
4.0  0.37 
5.0  0.54 
10.0  0.44 
15.0  0.38 
1  0.06 
3  0.44 
5  0.88 
Source: Author's  calculations  as described  in the text. 
a. Each  column  keeps  all parameters  fixed  at their  base  values,  except  the parameter  in the column  heading,  which 
is allowed  to vary. When  all parameters  are at their  base values, the target  net wealth-to-income  ratio  is 0.44. The 
base value  for each parameter  is shown  in parentheses  below the column  heading. 
b. Probabilities  of zero income  are shown  as a percent. 
c. Real  interest  rates  are shown  as a percent. 
d. Growth  rates  are shown  as a percent. 
e. Discount  rates  are shown  as a percent. 
ratio  of only 6 percent  of annual  income, while p = 5 increases  the target 
to 88 percent of income. Of course, it is not surprising  to find that the 
amount  of precautionary  saving is very sensitive to the degree of con- 
sumers' risk aversion. Varying  the other parameters  generally  moves 
the target  ratio  from  35 percent  to 60 percent  of annual  income. 
Informal  evidence that  this is a reasonable  characterization  of behav- 
ior comes from personal financial  planning  guides. These guides com- 
monly have passages that advise consumers  to maintain  a buffer  stock 84  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
of assets. The following  excerpt  from  a 1989  Touche  Ross financial  plan- 
ning  guide  provides  an example: 
It is generally  held that your liquid  assets should roughly  equal four to six 
months'  employment  income. If you are in an unstable  employment  situation 
...  the amount  should  probably  be greater.  [Your]  need for liquidity  is deter- 
mined  by the predictability  of your cash income and  expenditures,  by your em- 
ployment  security,  and  by your  investment  strategy.50 
The Dynamic  Reaction  to a Change  in Target Wealth: An 
Example 
The figures  in table  3 showed how the target  net wealth  ratio  depends 
on the model's  parameter  values, and  figure  4 and  the discussion  showed 
that in the long run, gross wealth will converge to the target. What  has 
not been discussed  yet, however, is the short-run  dynamics  of consump- 
tion, saving, and wealth when parameters  change. For example, sup- 
pose  the probability of unemployment and zero-income events in- 
creased  from  0.5 percent  to 1  percent  per  year.5' Table  3 showed  that  the 
target  net wealth/income  ratio  will increase  from  0.44 to 0.56. But what 
happens to consumption, saving, and wealth immediately after the 
change?  The first  consequence, illustrated  in figure  5, is that  the new op- 
timal  consumption  rule is lower than  the old one, indicating  that, at any 
given level of gross wealth, in the new more  uncertain  environment,  the 
consumer  will save more  than  before. 
To trace out the dynamic behavior of consumption, saving, and 
wealth, I assume that the consumer begins holding the optimal  gross 
wealth ratio  x4 implied  by the old unemployment  expectations  p = 0.5 
percent.  I then assume  that  the consumerjust  happens  to experience  the 
mean values, N  =  V =  1, of the uncertainty  variables  for the next few 
years of life (although  this does not affect his expectations  about  the fu- 
50. Touche  Ross (1989,  p. 10). 
51. This  exercise  is not strictly  valid  because  the model  is solved  under  the  assumption 
that  the probability  of zero-income  events is fixed, yet in the exercise here I assume  that 
the  probability  changes  from  0.5 percent  to 1  percent.  The  fully  correct  way to do this  exer- 
cise would  be to specify a Markov  transition  matrix  for the probability  of a zero-income 
event and  then to trace  out the reaction  when a transition  occurs. The results  would  pre- 
sumably  be qualitatively  similar,  but the magnitude  of the effects described  above would 
depend  on the properties  of the Markov  transition  matrix. Christopher  D. Carroll  85 
Figure  5. The Consumption  Rule before  and after  the Shock 
Consumption  ratio, c 
1.2 
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Gross wealth ratio,  x 
Source: Author's  calculations  as described  in the text. The probability  of income  falling  to zero is given  by p. 
ture distributions  of these variables).5 Applying  the consumption  rule 
recursively  traces out the dynamic  paths of consumption,  wealth, and 
saving. 
The results can be seen in figure  6. The change  in expectations  is as- 
sumed to occur between years 5 and 6. Leading  up to year 5, the con- 
sumer  was in equilibrium  with constant consumption,  net wealth, and 
saving ratios. In year 6, the first year of the new regime, consumption 
drops sharply  and the saving rate rises. Net wealth therefore  begins to 
increase;  as it does so, consumption  begins to recover toward  its long- 
run target  level. After its initial  surge, the saving rate declines steadily 
toward  its new, higher  target  level. In the end, the consumption  ratio  is 
slightly less than before the shock, while the saving rate and the net 
52. The completely  correct  way to do this experiment  would  be to derive  the steady- 
state  distribution  for x under  the first  set of assumptions,  and  then  calculate  the evolution 
of this distribution  over time subject  to the new consumption  rule and  the given distribu- 
tions  for uncertainty.  Simulations  of this kind  in my 1992  paper  (Carroll,  1992)  show that 
the procedure  described  here  provides  a good approximation  to the behavior  of the means 
of the variables  in the  full simulation  model. Figure 6.  The Consumption Ratio, the Personal Saving Rate, and the Wealth Ratio 
The ratio  of consumption  to personal  income, c 
0.99  _ 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  as described  in the text. 
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wealth  ratio  are  both higher.  Across steady states, the change  in the per- 
sonal saving  rate  will be given by comparing  gw* to gw*, where w* indi- 
cates the target  net wealth ratio before the change and w4  is the ratio 
afterwards.  So long  as w* is positive, if the growth  rate  of income  is posi- 
tive, the new target personal saving rate will be higher. On the other 
hand, the target saving rate gw* will be lower than the rate during  the 
transition  period, as wealth  is being  built  up from  w* to w. 
How  Would the Model Differ with Explicit Liquidity Constraints? 
Despite the evidence of the second section, the assumption  that in- 
come can go to zero and potentially  stay there for the remainder  of life 
seems somewhat artificial.  Arguments  above demonstrated,  however, 
that  simply  assuming  that  income  has a lower  bound  above zero does not 
change the model qualitatively;  it just makes h-the  vertical axis in 
figure  4-negative  rather  than  zero. For  lower  bounds  on income  to have 
any effect other  than  a shift  of axes, explicit  borrowing  constraints  must 
also be present and relevant. (To be relevant, constraints  must limit 
wealth  to be somewhere  above h, because consumers  would  not wish to 
borrow more than h anyway.) It would be useful to treat such con- 
straints  explicitly  because it would  then  be possible to explore  the quan- 
titative consequences of changing  the constraints.  However, the quali- 
tative consequences are intuitive and can be summarized  as follows. 
Imagine  a model like Deaton's in which consumers  are impatient,  have 
a positive minimum  future  labor  income (h < 0), but cannot borrow  at 
all (w = 0). Suppose, further,  that  on average  they hold a buffer  stock of 
size w*. If they are  suddenly  allowed  to borrow,  say, up  to amount  w < 0, 
they will eventually  reach a new steady-state  equilibrium  in which they 
on average  hold a target  wealth ratio, w4,  that  is less than  w*. Thus in a 
buffer-stock  model with relevant  borrowing  constraints,  loosening the 
constraints  should  result  in behavior  qualitatively  identical  to the effect 
of increasing  the minimum  guaranteed  future  income  in a model  without 
liquidity  constraints.  As long as average  wealth is positive both before 
and after the loosening of constraints,  the dynamic  behavior  of saving 
would  also be the same:  a sharp  drop  at first,  then  the partial  recovery  to 
stabilize  at a new rate  gw4 that is lower than  the initial  rate  gw*. 
It would be interesting  to analyze liquidity  constraints  quantitatively 
as well as qualitatively,  but that exercise is beyond the scope of this 88  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
paper. Some results  can be found  in Deaton's 1991  paper. In particular, 
Deaton  finds  that,  under  his parameter  values, consumers  often hold ex- 
actly zero assets.53  The rest of the time they hold a small  buffer stock, 
as in the model  presented  here. However, compared  to the assumptions 
here, Deaton's income process is quite benign.54  Most importantly, 
there is nothing  in his model that resembles a spell of unemployment. 
But the evidence of the second section of this paper, as well as casual 
experience, indicate that in the real world, outcomes occur that are 
much  worse than  any outcome  Deaton considers. 
Of course, it is possible that  these bad events are so rare  that  Deaton 
did not miss much by ignoring  them. The only way to know is to solve 
the model numerically  under  a range  of values for the probability  of un- 
employment  to see what the consequences are. But table 3 showed that 
the size of the target  buffer stock, w*, was quite sensitive to the prob- 
ability  of zero-income  events, strongly  suggesting  that the results from 
a model that ignores the possibility of unemployment  are likely to be 
substantially  different  from  the results  when unemployment  is explicitly 
treated. 
Dynan's  Empirical Test 
Before I present  my own empirical  evidence, a brief  discussion of an 
interesting  recent paper  by Karen  Dynan is in order.55  Using data from 
the 1985 Consumer Expenditure  Survey, Dynan calculates quarterly 
consumption  growth  and the variance  of quarterly  consumption  growth 
for a sample  of households, and estimates an equation  like equation  5, 
using instrumental  variables  for the Et var (A ln C,+  l) term, where the 
instruments  are  demographic  variables  such as age, occupation,  and  ed- 
ucation. She obtains  very low estimates  of p, and  concludes  that  the cer- 
tainty  equivalence  model cannot  be rejected  using  her data. 
I can think  of two main  reasons why a test like Dynan's might  obtain 
low or zero estimates of p, even if most consumers  have a value of p in 
53. Deaton(1991). 
54. In the published  version  of his paper,  I could not find  an indication  of the bounds 
of his income distribution  process; but if memory  serves, an earlier  draft  stated  that the 
bounds  were two standard  deviations  of income. Because the standard  deviation  of in- 
come is 0. 1, this  gives a lower  bound  of a 20 percent  drop  in income. 
55. Dynan(1991). Christopher  D. Carroll  89 
the range  assumed in this paper. The first  is a subtle theoretical  point; 
imagine  estimating  Dynan's model on a population  of buffer-stock  con- 
sumers  with exactly the same expected income growth  rate  g, but with 
some variation  across demographic  groups  (no matter  how slight)  in p, 
r, or 5. Because the consumption  growth  rate converges to the income 
growth  rate  for buffer-stock  consumers,  the expectation  of consumption 
growth  for each consumer  will be g, yet consumers  in different  groups 
will have different values of p - I (r -  5), so that consumers in each group 
will be converging  toward  a different  target  buffer-stock  and a different 
target  value  for Et  var (A  ln C,+  1). Assuming  Dynan's instruments  would 
correctly  identify the target  value for E, var (A ln C,+  1)  for each demo- 
graphic  group,  her instrumental  variables  test should  estimate  a value of 
p exactly equal to zero, because expected consumption  growth would 
be the same, g, for every consumer;  however, Et var (A ln Ct,+  ) would 
vary  by demographic  group. 
The second objection  to Dynan's  test is empirical.  Actually  testing  an 
Euler  equation  like 5 on quarterly  data, at the household  level, requires 
heroic assumptions  about the quality  and meaning  of the data. In prac- 
tice, the variability  of consumption  growth  at frequencies  as short  as one 
quarter  is likely  to be mostly  unrelated  to uncertainty.  The mere  fact that 
the quarterly  standard  deviation  of consumption  growth  is about  20 per- 
cent in her sample  should  give pause; this number  seems far too high  to 
represent  quarterly  uncertainty.  It seems much more likely that almost 
all of the quarterly  variation  has nothing  to do with uncertainty.  For in- 
stance, the variance  of quarterly  consumption  expenditures  is likely to 
depend  on whether  vacations are long or short, and the length  of vaca- 
tions is likely to be correlated  with occupation. Alternatively,  people 
with more education  might  be more likely to send their children  to ex- 
pensive schools, causing large fluctuations  in quarterly  spending  be- 
tween the summer  and the school year. Instruments  would discover 
higher  var (A  ln C)  for occupations  with long vacations, or for more  edu- 
cated people, but this would be unrelated  to uncertainty  and would 
therefore  not correspond  to higher  consumption  growth.  Thus the esti- 
mate  of p would  be biased  toward  zero. 
Dynan's paper  is a valuable  contribution,  but I suspect that her tests 
simply  demand  too much  of her data. The buffer-stock  model  delivers a 
wide variety of testable predictions, and my own instinct is that tests 
using  lower  frequency  data, and  tests based on the level of saving  rather 90  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
than the growth  rate of consumption,  are likely to be more robust  than 
Euler equation tests such as Dynan's using quarterly  household-level 
consumption.  I turn  now to some macroeconomic  evidence along  these 
lines. 
The Buffer-Stock  Model and Some Empirical Evidence 
This section argues  that the buffer-stock  model provides  a better  ex- 
planation  for a variety of empirical  findings  than simple versions of the 
LC/PIH model, a simple Keynesian model, or a hybrid  like that pro- 
posed by Campbell  and Mankiw.56  At the outset, it is important  to be 
precise about  what is meant  by each model. What  this section refers to 
as the simple  LC/PIH  model  is any model  in which  the principal  purpose 
of saving  is to smooth  consumption  over large, low-frequency,  predict- 
able fluctuations  in income. The simplest such models are the various 
certainty-equivalence  models (CEQ), although models with constant 
absolute risk aversion  would also generally  fall into this category. The 
simple Keynesian model will be taken to be a model of the form C = 
aot  + otl  Y,  where consumption  has a positive intercept  aot  and there is a 
constant  marginal  propensity  to consume  otl  that  is close to one (perhaps 
0.9). The Campbell-Mankiw  model blends these two models by assum- 
ing that half of income goes to LC/PIH consumers and half goes to 
Keynesian  consumers with parameters aot  =  0 and otl =  1. 
This section will consider whether  these models are consistent with 
three categories of macroeconomic  evidence. First is some evidence 
that Lawrence Summers  and I developed.57  We found that aggregate 
consumption  growth and income growth appear to be closely linked 
over periods  of a few years or longer. In contrast  to the LC/PIH  model, 
the buffer-stock  model  provides  a simple  explanation:  if there  is a target 
net-to-wealth  income ratio, consumption  growth and income growth 
must converge; otherwise  wealth would explode up or down. The sec- 
ond category  is evidence that the personal  saving  rate  depends strongly 
on the unemployment  rate and expectations about future unemploy- 
ment, even controlling  for expectations about future income growth. 
56. Campbell  and  Mankiw  (1989). 
57. Carroll  and  Summers  (1991). Christopher  D. Carroll  91 
Such  results  strongly  suggest  the presence  of a precautionary  saving  mo- 
tive. The final  category  of evidence comes from  estimating  Euler  equa- 
tions  for consumption  growth.  I find  that  the growth  rate  of consumption 
is slower in periods  when unemployment  fears are high. Again, the cer- 
tainty  equivalence  model  contains  no explanation  for  this. However, the 
buffer-stock  model also has some difficulty  explaining  the results. The 
combined  results of this section suggest that when consumers  become 
more pessimistic about the prospects of unemployment,  they adjust 
their consumption downward. However, the adjustment is  gradual 
rather  than  instantaneous. 
The ConsumptionlIncome  Parallel 
Figure  7 illustrates  one of the most robust  findings  of my 1991  paper 
with  Lawrence  Summers:  across countries,  and  within  the same  country 
over time, over periods  of a few years or longer, the growth  rate  of con- 
sumption  tends to be very close to the growth  rate  of income.58  We find 
near-equality  of consumption growth and income growth rates over 
periods  as short  as five years. 
If aggregate  consumption  is modeled as resulting  from a representa- 
tive agent's  behavior,  the Euler  equation  5, reproduced  here  for conven- 
ience, will apply: 
(5)  1lnCt+I  =  p-I(r-  8) +  IpEtvar(AlnC,  1) +  e, 
The growth  rate  of income does not enter  directly  anywhere  in equa- 
tion 5. If we assume that the expected variance  of consumption  growth 
Et var (A ln Ct+  1)  is constant, equation  5 provides no direct  explanation 
for the consumption/income  parallel  of figure  7. 
In the long run, of course, countries  cannot  violate their  budget  con- 
straints,  and  under  suitable  conditions  it can  be shown  that  consumption 
growth  will eventually  converge to income growth  even in an economy 
where a facsimile  of equation  5 holds and Et var (A ln C,+  1)  is constant 
(perhaps zero). The mechanism for this is adjustment  of the capital 
stock. If consumption  is too high  and  growing  more slowly than  income, 
the capital  stock will be declining.  As the capital  stock declines, the in- 
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Figure 7.  Income and Consumption Growth in OECD Countries, 
Various Periods, 1960-85 
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Source: Carroll  and  Summers  (1991). 
terest rate increases, and, through  the first  term  in equation  5, as the in- 
terest rate increases, the growth  rate of consumption  increases toward 
the growth  rate  of income. Conversely,  if consumption  is low and  grow- 
ing  faster  than  income, the capital  stock will be increasing,  driving  inter- 
est rates down and reducing  the consumption  growth  rate. Either  way, 
the steady state is eventually  achieved with consumption  growth  equal 
to income  growth. 
Summers  and I argue, however, that this mechanism  cannot  explain 
why consumption  and income growth  rates are close at frequencies  of Christopher  D. Carroll  93 
five years or less.59  Adjusting  the capital  stock should  take decades, not 
years. A similar  objection  applies to life-cycle explanations  of the con- 
sumption/income  parallel  that  rely on intergenerational  productivity  dif- 
ferences to produce an equilibrium  where consumption  growth  equals 
income growth. Such models take at least a full generation  to equate 
consumption  growth  with income growth. 
Of course, if virtually  all of consumption  is done by Keynesian  con- 
sumers with otl near one, the consumption/income  parallel  is no mys- 
tery. But the Keynesian model performs  poorly at higher  frequencies, 
where consumption  and income growth are much less closely related, 
and is completely unable  to explain microeconomic  data on consump- 
tion and  income. 
The proposed  solution  to this puzzle comes from  recognizing,  as dis- 
cussed in the third section above, that the variance of consumption 
growth  depends  importantly  on the level of wealth. If most consumption 
is done by impatient  buffer-stock  consumers, then, as shown in figure 
4, consumption  growth  will converge to income growth. Intuitively,  if 
consumption  is too low and  growing  too fast, the consumer  must  be sav- 
ing. This saving  boosts the wealth stock, which reduces the variance  of 
consumption  growth, which reduces the expected growth  rate of con- 
sumption  down toward  the growth  rate  of income. If consumption  is too 
high and growing  too slowly, the consumer  will be dissaving;  as wealth 
falls, the expected variance  of consumption  growth  rises, increasing  the 
growth  rate  of consumption  up toward  the growth  rate  of income. 
The equality  of income and consumption  growth  rates in the buffer- 
stock framework holds at the target net wealth stock w*, but this 
prompts  the question  of whether  consumption  growth  will approach  in- 
come growth rapidly  enough to explain the consumption/income  par- 
allel. Table 4 addresses this question by examining  the transition  path 
after the growth rate of permanent  income changes in the model. The 
exact experiment  is as follows. The optimal  consumption  rule  is derived 
under the base assumptions described above, first with an expected 
growth  rate  g of 2 percent,  and  then  with  a growth  rate  of 0 percent  annu- 
ally. Consider  a consumer in year T -  1 who was holding  exactly his 
target  buffer stock of assets, so that his expected growth rate of con- 
sumption  in year T was 2 percent. Now suppose that this consumer 
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Table  4. The Growth  Rate of Consumption  Following  a Drop  in the Growth  Rate 
of Income 
Percent 
Income  Consumption 
Year  growth  rate  growth  rate 
T-1  2  2.00 
T  0  -2.85 
T+1  0  0.99 
T+2  0  0.73 
T+3  0  0.53 
T+4  0  0.39 
T+5  0  0.29 
Mean 
(Tto T+5)  0  0.01 
Source: Based on author's  calculations  as described  in the text. The expected  growth  rate of income starts  at 
2 percent  and then  falls to 0 percent  annually,  starting  at year T. 
learns, before deciding  his year T consumption,  that the growth  rate of 
his permanent  income  will henceforth  be 0 percent  rather  than  2 percent. 
In year T, consumption  will immediately  drop  because the present dis- 
counted  value  of future  income  is now lower. In years T + 1  and  beyond, 
the growth  rate  of consumption  will converge  toward  the growth  rate  of 
income. The table  computes  the growth  rates  of consumption  that  would 
occur if this consumer experienced the mean values of all shocks in 
years T  through  T + 5. 
After  the initial  shock of - 2.85 percent, the growth  rate  of consump- 
tion converges fairly rapidly  to the growth rate of income. By T +  3, 
consumption  growth  is 0.53 percent  and  by T + 5, it is only 0.29 percent. 
Over  the entire  period  from T  through  T + 5, the average  growth  rate  is 
0.01 percent-very  close indeed  to the 0 percent  growth  rate  of income. 
From  this evidence, the buffer-stock  model is thus capable  of quantita- 
tively as well as qualitatively  explaining  the consumption/income  par- 
allel. 
The CEQ-PIH Model and the Cyclical Behavior of the Personal 
Saving Rate 
According  to the simplest  CEQ-PIH model, in periods  when income 
is temporarily  low or temporarily  declining,  the saving  rate should  also 
be low or temporarily  declining. Recessions, of course, are periods of Christopher D.  Carroll  95 
Figure 8.  NIPA Personal Saving Rate around the Business Cycle Peak 
Index, business cycle peak =  100 
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Source: Author's  calculations  based on saving data from National  Income and Product  Accounts  (NIPA) and 
NBER-dated  business  cycle peaks. Index  at peak =  100.  For each postwar  recession,  the personal  saving  rates  for 
the four quarters  preceding  and following  the NBER peak quarter  are divided  by the rate  in the peak  quarter.  The 
figure  presents  the average  of the resulting  figures  for each quarter  between  four  quarters  prior  to and  four  quarters 
after  the peak  (multiplied  by 100). 
temporarily  low or temporarily  declining income, yet figure 8 shows 
that, on average,  the personal  saving  rate  as defined  by the National  In- 
come and Product  Accounts (NIPA) does not decline as the economy 
enters  a recession.60  A related  point  is made  by figure  9, which shows the 
ratio  of household  debt to personal  disposable  income.6'  If the simplest 
CEQ-PIH model were a complete explanation  of consumer  spending, 
the ratio  of debt to consumption  should  be increasing  during  recessions 
because people should  borrow  to cover expenses while income is tem- 
60. The NIPA personal  saving rate includes expenditures  on consumer  durables  as 
consumption.  Economic theory, however, suggests that there is an important  sense in 
which durables  spending  is more like saving than like consumption.  Because durables 
spending  is highly  procyclical,  if saving  is redefined  to include  durables  spending,  saving 
will be procyclical  too. This  issue is discussed  in greater  detail  below. 
61. The  general  pattern  of debt  deceleration  during  recessions  occurs  in all major  sub- 
categories of debt: mortgage  liabilities, consumer installment  credit, other consumer 
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Figure  9. Ratio  of Total  Household  Debt to Personal  Disposable  Income 
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ing recessions. 
Precautionary  saving motives provide  a natural  explanation  for why 
consumers do not reduce saving or increase borrowing  during  reces- 
sions. Anecdotal evidence of this abounds. A Gallup  poll in Britain  in 
August 1991, while Britain  was in recession, found that 60 percent of 
households thought  it was a good time to increase their savings, while 
73 percent expected unemployment  to increase. One of the poll direc- 
tors said "consumers  everywhere  were inclined  towards  'precautionary 
saving' to provide a cushion against the threat of unemployment.  63 A 
62. Of course, the model's  implications  are  really  about  net worth  rather  than  debt. It 
is true  that  net  worth  is procyclical,  but  I concentrate  on the  behavior  of debt  because  asset 
revaluations  make  interpretations  of the  cyclical  behavior  of household  net worth  difficult. 
It thus  remains  possible  that  the apparently  anomalous  behavior  of debt  is due to portfolio 
shifts  and  does not fundamentally  constitute  a violation  of the CEQ-PIH model. 
63. "Consumer  Caution  Constrains  Recovery," The Times of London, August 7, 
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May 1992  editorial  in the U.S. trade  publication  Automotive  News cor- 
roborated  such sentiments:64 
[F]olks  still  aren't  buying  cars....  And  I am  convinced  that  most  Americans  are 
still  concerned  about  their  jobs. As long  as that  insecurity  exists, we are  going  to 
see a sluggish  auto  industry. 
These quotations  suggest  that  unemployment  expectations  have a di- 
rect effect on the saving  rate. However, the CEQ-PIH model provides 
no direct role for unemployment  expectations; only expected income 
matters.  Formally,  Campbell  showed that  under  his model, current  sav- 
ing, S,  should  equal the present discounted  value of expected declines 
in income:65 
(6)  St =  -E  R-i  A  Yt+i, 
where Y  is income and  R is the discount  factor. 
Campbell  found some aggregate  evidence supporting  the proposition 
that consumers save more when future income growth is slower; he 
called this phenomenon  "saving for a rainy  day." Thus if expectations 
about future unemployment  and future income growth could be mea- 
sured directly, a valid test of the CEQ-PIH model would be to see 
whether  the current  saving  rate  depends  on unemployment  expectations 
after controlling  for income expectations. I conducted such tests, first 
using data drawn  from solely from the University of Michigan  Surveys 
of Consumers,1  and  next combining  the survey  data  with  aggregate  data 
on personal saving and unemployment.  In both cases, unemployment 
data  are shown  to have an important  influence  on saving,  even after  con- 
trolling  for income expectations. 
Consumers participating  in the Surveys of Consumers are asked 
whether  over the next one or two years  they expect their  own household 
real  income  to increase  or decrease, and  whether  over the next year  they 
expect the unemployment  rate to increase or decrease. They are also 
asked:  "If there  were a major  purchase  that  you wanted  to make, do you 
think  that  now is a time when it would be okay to use some of your sav- 
64.  Automotive News,  May 11, 1992, p. 12. 
65. Campbell  (1987). 
66. University  of Michigan,  Surveys  of Consumers.  The data exist for every month 
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ings, or is now a time when you would be especially reluctant  to use 
some of your savings?"  I constructed  three  indexes: one for the fraction 
of consumers  who believe it is "not okay" to draw  down their savings 
(SAV); one for the fraction  who believe the unemployment  rate will in- 
crease (MU); and one for the fraction  who believed household  income 
would  increase  (MY). 
These questions,  of course, do not correspond  directly  to the theoret- 
ical constructs  in Campbell's  equation,  but with some imagination  it is 
possible to use them to perform  a loose test of the model. It seems rea- 
sonable  to interpret  SA  V,  as a proxy for saving  S, on the theory  that  peo- 
ple are "especially reluctant"  to draw down their liquid assets during 
periods when they would be more likely to save in order to increase 
those liquid  assets. More  formally,  SAV,  can be interpreted  as an indica- 
tor of the shadow value of liquid assets. Under this interpretation,  it 
should  be positively correlated  with saving  in the form  of liquid  assets. 
I will interpret  MYas a proxy  for the expected changes  in income  over 
the next year  or two, MY, =  y E, Sin=  I A Y, j, where  n is either 12  months 
or 24 months  depending  on how one wishes to interpret  the question. In 
this case, because  R is close to one, MY,-  y S=  R-i AY,,j. Thus defin- 
ing a  =  1iy, we can rewrite  Campbell's  equation  as 
St  MYt + R-  a  Myt+n  +  R-  a MYt+2n.  .  .  +  et, 
where et is the error  term  in time period  t. 
Define PDVMY,  =  R-'1 Mt+n  +  R-2n MYyt2  +  ....  Then Camp- 
bell's equation  becomes: 
(7)  St  :: O1  (MYt + PDVMY,)  +  et, 
and  the prediction  of equation  6 is that  a is negative.  Of  course, PDVMY, 
is not observable, so we cannot estimate equation  7. What  we can esti- 
mate  is 
(8)  SAVt =  oto  +  ot1  MYt +  vt. 
PDVMYt is  an  omitted variable in  this  equation. If  corr(MYt, 
PDVMY,) $  0, the coefficient  al will be biased, so it might  appear  to be 
impossible  to test the CEQ-PIH model  by estimating  equation  8. This is 
unduly  pessimistic, however, because if corr(MYt,PDVMY,)  - 0, then 
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PDVMY,) - 0 amounts  to an assumption  that expectations of income 
growth  over the short term are not negatively  correlated  with expecta- 
tions of growth over the long term. A formal test of this assumption 
would require  estimating  a time-series  process for MY so that values of 
MYcould be projected  into the infinite  future  to construct  PDVMY.  For 
instance, suppose MY follows an AR(1) process, so that MY, = a + b 
MY, 1.  If b is positive, then  corr  (MY, PDVMY,)  > 0. In  fact, when such 
equations  are estimated,  b is indeed  positive. 
A simpler approach, however,  is to estimate MY, =  a  +  b MY,-, 
because in this case if JR-n bl <  1, we have PDVMY,  =  k +  [R-n bl 
(1 -  R-n b)] MY,  where k is an uninteresting  constant. If we estimate 
equation  8, the expected value of ot1  will be a1 =  a [1 + (R-n bil  -  R-n 
b)]. The CEQ-PIH model implies  that  a < 0, so if b > 0, then the theory 
implies that a1 < 0. When this equation  is estimated  on monthly  data, 
the result  is 
MY, =  45.5  +  0.02  MYt_12. 
(8.2)  (0.22) 
Thus, with enough  assumptions,  it is possible to coax from  the CEQ- 
PIH model the implication  that a1 < 0. Regression 1 in table 5 presents 
the results of estimating  equation  8, and, as predicted, a1 is estimated 
to be negative and statistically  significant;  households express greater 
reluctance  to dip  into savings  in periods  when  they are  pessimistic  about 
income growth. 
Now consider  estimating  the following  regression: 
(9)  SAV, =  oao  +  a^1 MYt +  at2  MUt + vt. 
Unemployment  expectations entered nowhere in equation  6, so ac- 
cording  to the CEQ-PIH model,  Oa2  should  be zero so long as corr(MUt, 
PDVM  Y) = 0. In a buffer-stock  model,  by contrast,  a higher  probability 
ofjob loss increases  the target  buffer  stock w*, so heightened  job insecu- 
rity should  be associated with a higher  personal  saving rate in both the 
short  and  the long  run.67  As regression  2 of table  5 shows, when equation 
67. It is not clear, however, whether  the degree of employment  insecurity  depends 
more  on the level of the unemployment  rate  or on the expected change  in the unemploy- 
ment  rate.  For  the moment,  however,  I am  considering  only variables  in the Michigan  sur- 
vey, which  means  MU, the expected  change  in the unemployment  rate.  In analysis  below 
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Table  5. Regressions  Relating  Saving  or Credit  to Expected  Changes  in Unemployment 
and Income 
Independent  AR(])  Number 
variablesc  serial  Box-  of 
Regres-  Dependent  correlation  _  Pierce  observa- 
siona  variableb  MY  MU  coefficient  R2  p-value  tions 
(1)  SAV  -0.61  ...  ...  0.08  0.00  118 
-(1.97) 
(2)  SAV  -0.27  0.42  ...  0.49  0.00  118 
-(1.36)  (5.88) 
(3)  SA V  -0.20  0.38  0.38  0.58  0.98  41 
-(1.37)  (4.12)  (2.42) 
(4)  CRED  -0.32  . .  .  . ..  0.01  0.00  120 
-(1.16) 
(5)  CRED  0.03  0.42  ...  0.38  0.00  120 
(0.15)  (6.18) 
(6)  CRED  -0.08  0.29  -0.24  0.32  0.46  41 
-(0.54)  (4.08)  (-0.14) 
Source: Author's  calculations  using  data  from  the University  of Michigan,  Surveys of Consumers,  various  issues. 
Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.  The data  are at a monthly  frequency  and different  series are available  over 
somewhat  different  periods.  The sample  period  for all data  ends in July 1992.  All series are available  every month 
beginning  in January  1989,  but before  that  time some series are available  only in scattered  months.  The number  of 
observations  therefore  varies  from  regression  to regression  because  different  methods  of estimation  impose  different 
requirements  for availability  of lagged  values.  For instance,  calculating  a first  difference  requires  observations  in two 
adjacent  months,  while calculating  an AR(l) restricts  the sample  to the period  over which  data were available  in 
every month.  A constant  term  was also estimated  but is not reported. 
a. Regressions  1, 2, 4, and  5 display  evidence  of serial  correlation,  so the reported  t-statistics  use autocorrelation 
and  heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  calculated  using  the procedure  described  in Newey  and  West  (1987). 
This procedure  is valid  if the form  of the autocorrelation  is an MA process  of limited  length.  I chose a lag of eight. 
b. I created  the dependent  variables  used in the regressions  from answers  to questions  asked in the Michigan 
surveys.  The exact questions  asked  in the surveys  were as follows: 
"If there  were  a major  purchase  that  you wanted  to make,  do you think  that  now is a time  when  it would  be okay 
to use some  of your  savings,  or is now a time  when  you would  be especially  reluctant  to use some of your  savings?" 
SAV = (fraction  answering  not okay)  minus  (fraction  answering  okay). 
"If there  were something  that you wanted  to buy, do you think  that now is a time when it would  be okay to buy 
on credit,  or is now a time when you would  be especially  reluctant  to take on new debt?" 
CRED  = (fraction  answering  not okay) minus  (fraction  answering  okay). 
c. The independent  variables  reflect  answers  to the following  questions  from  the Michigan  survey:  "[In]  the next 
year  or two, do you expect that  your  (family)  income  will  go up more  than  prices  will go up, or less than  prices  will 
go up?" 
MY = (fraction  answering  "more  than  prices")  minus  (fraction  answering  "less than  prices"). 
"How about  people  out of work  during  the next 12 months-do you think  that there  will be more  unemployment 
than  now, about  the same, or less?" 
MU = (fraction  answering  "more"  unemployment)  minus  (fraction  answering  "less" unemployment). 
9 is estimated,  ?l2 is highly significant  and positive, while al, although 
still negative,  is no longer  statistically  significant.  The obvious interpre- 
tation is that the CEQ model is wrong because the expected change in 
the unemployment  rate  affects current  saving,  even after  controlling  for 
expectations about income growth. However, it remains  possible that 
MUt matters only because it is correlated  with the omitted variable, 
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To test this possibility, I ran regressions  of the form MY, =  a  +  b 
MYt_i + c MUt__.  If the only reason  MU is related  to SAV is that  MU 
is a good indicator  of expectations  about  future  changes in income, we 
should  expect to see a strongly  negative coefficient  c on MU.68 In fact, 
MU is only very weakly negatively related  to future  expected changes 
in income: 
MY,-  46.0  +  0.02 MYt-12  -  0.02  MUt-12. 
(7.9)  (0.18)  -(0.33) 
This regression  suggests that it is unlikely  that the reason MU is so 
strongly correlated with SAV is because MU is a good predictor of 
PDVMY.  This does not amount,  of course, to a rigorous  test of whether 
regression 2 of table 5 is consistent with the CEQ model; such a test 
would  be valuable,  but is beyond  the scope of this paper. 
The Box-Pierce statistic for regression 2 indicates substantial  evi- 
dence of serial correlation, so regression 3 reports the results when 
AR(1) serial  correlation  in the errors  is assumed. The AR(1)  coefficient 
is highly  significant,  but  there  is no evidence of further  serial  correlation. 
The coefficient  on the expected change  in income is diminished  further, 
and is now well below the threshold  for statistical  significance.  The un- 
employment  expectations  variable,  however, remains  overwhelmingly 
statistically  significant. 
In modern  econometrics, it is often considered  inappropriate  to ad- 
dress a problem  of serial  correlation  by simply  assuming  an AR(1)  error 
process because the model being  tested often does not imply  that serial 
correlation  in the error  term should  exist. Indeed, the CEQ-PIH model 
does not provide any explicit justification  for serial correlation  in the 
saving  rate. However, in a buffer-stock  model, the saving  rate  should  be 
highly serially  correlated  because the personal  saving  rate is a function 
of the net wealth ratio, an omitted variable that certainly should be 
highly serially correlated. In this sense, the existence of strong serial 
correlation  might  be construed  as further  evidence in favor  of the buffer- 
stock model. 
68. In this case, under further  simplifying  assumptions,  PDVMY, =  K +  [R-n bl 
(1 -  R-n b) MYt1n] +  R-n cI(l  -  R-n b) MUt-n. When  equation  9 is estimated,  the re- 
sulting  estimates  of a1  and  ?L2  should  be  a1 =  a[1 + (R-n  bIl  -R-n  b)], and  ?L2 =  ot (R-n  C/ 
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Economists  are skeptical  of polls, both because it is difficult  to know 
whether respondents  understand  the questions as economists would, 
and because often what people say is not what they do. It is important, 
therefore,  to know whether  data  on actual  spending  corroborate  the re- 
sults of table 5. Table 6 therefore  presents regressions  in which the de- 
pendent variable  is the aggregate  personal saving rate, s, rather  than 
SA V.  69 Regression  1  reproduces  the result  of regression  1  in table  5; sav- 
ing is negatively  associated with expected income growth,  as predicted 
by the CEQ-PIH model. However, unlike  table 5, the coefficient  is not 
significant  here. Regression 2 adds two variables:  MU, the expected 
change  in the unemployment  rate, and U, the current  level of the unem- 
ployment  rate. Both  the level and  the expected change  in unemployment 
are  included  because  it is not clear  which  is likely to be a better  indicator 
of households' fears about  job loss. My own intuition  is that  job fears 
are probably  greater  when the unemployment  rate is unchanging  at 10 
percent than when the unemployment  rate is 5 percent but increasing; 
this would imply that Ut might  matter  more than MUt. Regression  2 of 
table 6 finds that both are highly statistically significant  with positive 
signs: saving  is higher  both when the current  level of the unemployment 
rate  is high  and  when the unemployment  rate  is expected to rise. 
Regression  2 is subject  to the same critique  leveled at regression  2 in 
table 5: it is possible that Ut and MU,t  are significant  only because they 
are correlated  with PDVMYt,  rather  than because expectations about 
unemployment  have a direct  effect on saving. As above, a crude  test of 
this is to run  a regression  of the form  MYt  =  a +  b MYt_n +  c MUt_n + 
d Ut___. If c and d were strongly negative, it would add credibility to the 
hypothesis that MUt and Ut explain current  saving only because they 
provide  a signal  about  income after  the period  covered by MYt.  The re- 
sults of such a regression  are70 
MY, =  45.7  +  0.09  MYt4  -  0.05  MUt4  -  34.8  Ut-4. 
(4.7)  (0.58)  -  (0.14)  -(0.62) 
69. This is calculated  as the difference  between  total  disposable  personal  income  and 
total  personal  consumption  expenditures-both defined  as in Blinder  and  Deaton  (1985)- 
divided by total disposable labor income. This is the measure  used by Campbell  and 
Deaton  (1989). 
70. In this regression,  n = 4 rather  than 12 as above because these regressions  use 
quarterly  rather  than  monthly  data.  The t-statistics  are  corrected  for serial  correlation  us- 
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The results are similar  to those presented above for MU  using the 
monthly  data:  MUt and U, are negatively associated with future  MYt, 
but the relationship  is quite  weak, so it appears  unlikely  that  MU and U 
are  useful  in explaining  the current  saving  rate  only because of their  abil- 
ity to forecast  PDVMYt. Again,  it would  be valuable  to test this hypothe- 
sis more rigorously,  but such an exercise is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
As with regression  2 of table 5, the residuals  of regression  2 in table  6 
exhibit strong evidence of serial correlation.7'  Regression 3 therefore 
estimates  a similar  equation  allowing  for an  AR(1)  error  term  in the equa- 
tion. The coefficient  on U, remains  positive and strongly  significant,  but 
the significance  of MUt  is diminished  substantially. 
Another  possible objection  to the results  of tables 5 and 6 is that  they 
may stem from reverse causality:  perhaps  exogenous increases in the 
saving rate cause the expected subsequent  increases in the unemploy- 
ment rate. To see how this could happen, consider  an IS/LM economy 
in which consumers  are rational  but subject  to random  shocks to taste 
that  move consumption.  A negative  consumption  shock  means  high  sav- 
ing now, but the drop  in C reduces aggregate  demand.  As demand  falls, 
firms  fire some workers  and pay their  remaining  workers  less. So an in- 
crease in saving  is followed by drops  in employment  and income. 
Regressions  4, 5, and 6 address  this problem  by reestimating  regres- 
sions 1, 2 and 3 using  instrumental  variables.  Using variables  dated  time 
t -  2 and earlier  as instruments  removes the simultaneity  problem,  as 
long as the shock to taste is not correlated  with variables  dated  t -  2 or 
earlier.  For regression  5, the results  are similar  to those of regression  2: 
the predicted  unemployment  rate is strongly  positively associated with 
the current saving rate. For regression 6, however, which allows for 
AR(1)  serial  correlation  in the error  term, none of the three explanatory 
variables  is statistically  significant.  This means that it is not possible to 
rule out reverse causality as an explanation  for the dependence of the 
personal  saving  rate  on current  and  expected future  unemployment. 
Another  criticism  of these regression  results  might  be in the definition 
of saving as the difference  between disposable labor income and total 
personal consumption  expenditures, which includes expenditures  for 
71. However,  an  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test is able  to reject  the hypothesis  that  the 
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durable  goods. The theory of durable  goods implies that purchases of 
durables  might be more appropriately  thought of as saving than con- 
sumption,  because a durable  good provides  a store  of value (an "asset") 
that  is "consumed"  over many subsequent  periods. Thus much  empiri- 
cal macroeconomic  work  has concentrated  on consumption  of nondura- 
bles and services, or the ratio  of nondurables  and services consumption 
to income.72  If the fraction  of consumption  expenditures  devoted  to non- 
durables  and services consumption  were stationary, then it might be 
possible to construct a "nondurables  and services" saving ratio, as 
Campbell  attempts  to do.73  However, this ratio  appears  to follow a ran- 
dom walk with drift, so I was unable  to construct  a sensible indicator  of 
the saving  rate  using  expenditures  on nondurables  and services. 
It is possible, therefore, that the results of table 6 are caused solely 
by a sharp  decline in purchases  of durable  goods when  job fears  worsen. 
If durables  purchases  were a perfect  substitute  for other  forms  of saving, 
the assertion  that saving  increases  when  job fears worsen  would  then be 
unjustified;  the correct statement  would be that the mix of saving shifts 
away from acquisition of durable goods to other forms of saving. I 
should  note that  this is not an implication  of the CEQ-PIH model  of dur- 
ables as developed, for instance, by Mankiw.74  However, the fact that 
substantial  transactions  costs are associated with the purchase  and sale 
of durable  goods means that they are not a perfect substitute  for other 
assets. They are  a particularly  bad substitute  for the kind  of liquid  assets 
that are most useful as a buffer  stock against  uncertainty.  As a first  ap- 
proximation,  therefore,  I would  argue  that  for the purposes  of testing  for 
the effects of employment  uncertainty  on saving,  the NIPA definition  of 
saving  used in table 6 is probably  the appropriate  definition. 
From  the evidence of tables 5 and 6 it appears  that, even controlling 
for expectations  about  future  income  growth,  consumers  both  express a 
greater  desire  to save and  actually  save more  when they believe that  the 
unemployment  rate  will be rising.  They also save more  when the level of 
the unemployment  rate is high. Although  these results cannot defini- 
72. See, for example,  Campbell  (1987)  and  Cochrane  (1991). 
73. Campbell  (1987). 
74. Mankiw  (1981).  It is, however, an implication  of the (S, s) model of durables  as 
developed in Eberly (1992). She finds that that model implies that spending  should be 
highly  sensitive  to uncertainty.  Her empirical  tests confirm  this  prediction,  although  using 
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tively rule out either  the CEQ-PIH model or an IS/LM model in which 
rational  consumers  are subject  to shocks in taste, it seems fair  to say that 
the most straightforward  interpretation  is that people save more when 
fears about  job security increase-a  natural  implication  of the buffer- 
stock model, but not of the CEQ-PIH model or the Keynesian  model. 
Unemployment Expectations  and the Campbell-Mankiw Model 
Even if the results  of tables  5 and  6 were entirely  inconsistent  with  the 
CEQ-PIH  framework,  this might  not be very interesting  because  a great 
many  papers  have already  rejected  a wide variety  of implications  of that 
model  (although  rarely,  as here, in favor  of an alternative  model  in which 
consumers are in a sense more rational  and sophisticated  than in the 
CEQ model). It would therefore  be interesting  to test a model that has 
not already  been rejected  many  times. The Campbell-Mankiw  model is 
the obvious candidate.  Campbell  and Mankiw  state: "We expect that 
the simple  model  presented  here . ..  will be hard  to beat  as a description 
of the aggregate  data  on consumption,  income, and  interest  rates."75 
Regressions 1 and 3 of table 7 reproduce  the basic result  of Campbell 
and Mankiw  for both total consumption  and consumption  of nondur- 
ables and services: spending responds significantly to  predictable 
changes  in income, even using twice-lagged  instruments.  Regressions  2 
and 4, however, show that when the instrumented  value of the Univer- 
sity of Michigan  Surveys of Consumers  unemployment  expectations 
variable  is added  to the right  hand  side of the equation,  it is highly  statis- 
tically significant;  moreover,  the change  in income  is less significant  and 
has a smaller coefficient than before the expectations variable was 
added. 
The unemployment  expectations  variable  has a negative coefficient, 
implying  that  consumption  growth  is slower in periods  when consumers 
are pessimistic  about  future  unemployment  conditions. Intuition  might 
indicate  that this is favorable  evidence for the idea that precautionary 
saving is important.  Recall, however, that the Euler equation  for con- 
sumption  under  uncertainty  was 
(5)  1  InC,  I =  p-I(r-8)+IEtvar(A  InCt+ )+et+  I  ~~~~~~~~ 
75. Campbell  and  Mankiw  (1989,  p. 212). Christopher  D. Carroll  107 
Table  7. Regressions  of the Change  in Consumption  on the Change  in Income 
and the Unemployment  Expectations  Index 
Independent  Box- 
Dependent  variablesc  Pierce 
Regressiona  variableb  Constant  A In Y  MU  R2  p-value 
(1)  A In C  0.195  0.717  ...  -0.02  0.08 
(2.54)  (6.88) 
(2)  A In C  0.507  0.403  -1.273  0.35  0.01 
(4.95)  (3.41)  -(3.65) 
(3)  A In CNS  0.525  0.484  ...  0.08  0.88 
(9.65)  (6.41) 
(4)  A In CNS  0.743  0.267  -0.887  0.39  0.58 
(10.47)  (2.99)  -(3.50) 
(5)  A In CN  0.341  0.013  -0.906  0.04  0.02 
(2.76)  (0.  10)  -(1.91) 
(6)  A In CFOOD  0.222  0.114  -  1.008  0.09  0.45 
(1.85)  (0.63)  -(2.17) 
(7)  A In CREC  0.960  0.098  -0.793  -0.02  0.00 
(4.27)  (0.47)  - (1.06) 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using  data from the  University  of  Michigan,  Surveys  of  Consumers,  and  NIPA. 
Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
a.  Regressions  are instrumented using the same set of twice-lagged  instruments described  in table 6. As  in tables 
5 and 6, the t-statistics  were calculated  with heteroskedasticity  and autocorrelation-consistent  standard errors using 
the  Newey-West  procedure  with  eight  lags  and  a  damping  factor  of  one.  All  variables  are  in  1987 dollars.  The 
dependent variable and the A In Y variable were multiplied by  100 so that the regression  results could be interpreted 
as percentage  points per quarter. 
b.  The dependent  variables are defined as follows: 
C is total real personal consumption  expenditures  following  Blinder and Deaton  (1985), 
CNS  is total real PCE for nondurable goods  and service,  excluding  clothing,  following  Blinder and Deaton (1985), 
who argue that at the quarterly frequency,  clothing is a durable good, 
CN is total real PCE for nondurable goods,  excluding  clothing, 
CFOOD is total real PCE for food,  and 
CREC is total real PCE for personal recreation services. 
c.  The independent variables are defined as follows: 
A In Y is the change in log of personal disposable  income,  and 
MU is unemployment  expectations,  as defined in table 5. 
According  to this equation, consumption  should grow  faster  in pe- 
riods when uncertainty  (the expected variance of future consumption 
growth)  is higher.  This counterintuitive  result is explained  by figure  6, 
presented  in the third  section. The reaction  to an increase  in uncertainty 
is for the saving  rate  to increase  as soon as uncertainty  increases  (which 
was confirmed  by the results  in tables 5 and  6). Thereafter  consumption 
should  grow slightly  faster  than  before as the wealth stock is built  up to- 
ward  its target  level. Thus, in periods  when uncertainty  is high but un- 
changing, consumption  growth  should  be high  (at  least until  the new tar- 
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Figure  10. Slow Adjustment  of Consumption 




Model  /  5-  - 
0.97  consumption  -.  \  Moving average  0.96  L  ~path  \  <  /  consumption  pathl 
0.96- 
0.95- 
l  l  I  I  I  III 
1  3  5  7  9  1  1  13  15 
Time period 
Source:  Author's  calculations.  The model consumption  rate depicts  an optimal target path in which the consumer 
earns  expected  income  for the first five  periods  and unemployment  expectations  change  in the  sixth  period,  as  in 
figure 6.  The  moving  average  consumption  path depicts  a moving  average  of current consumption  and two  lagged 
values of the optimal consumption  path. 
A speculative  explanation  of these results  is given in figure  10. If it is 
difficult  to adjust  consumption  downward  instantaneously,  the level of 
consumption  might  adjust  slowly to an increase  in uncertainty.  The line 
labeled  "model  consumption  path" simply  reproduces  the consumption 
path  calculated  in figure  6 for the optimal  behavior  following  an increase 
in the expected probability  of unemployment.  The line labeled "moving 
average  consumption  path" shows the average  of the current  value and 
the last two values of the "model  consumption  path.  " The moving  aver- 
age consumption  path  is designed  to capture  the idea that consumption 
might  adjust  slowly, rather  than  instantly,  to the new unemployment  ex- 
pectations.  In the moving  average  consumption  path, consumption  falls 
both in the initial period and in the two following periods (when no 
change in expectations occurred). Other-Ahan  its predictions for the 
growth  rate  of consumption  immediately  following  a shock, the qualita- 
tive implications  of this model are largely similar  to those of the model 
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stock model would find that consumption displays "excess  smooth- 
ness" with respect to current  changes in unemployment  expectations, 
and could also find that the predictable  level of unemployment  is im- 
portant  for current  consumption  growth. 
Certainly  slow adjustment  must be the rule  for some important  cate- 
gories of nondurables  and services consumption.  For instance, one of 
the largest  components  of services consumption  is imputed  rent  on own- 
er-occupied  housing. Imputed  rent changes either  when a house is sold 
or when it is revalued.  Given  the transactions  costs associated  with  buy- 
ing and selling  houses, it would be unreasonable  to expect this compo- 
nent of consumption  to adjust downward  instantly, or within a single 
quarter,  upon news of a higher probability  of future unemployment. 
Similarly,  expenditures  on household  utilities are probably  determined 
largely  by the characteristics  of the home and  might  be difficult  to adjust 
quickly.  Many  other  components  of consumption  also plausibly  may be 
difficult  to adjust  instantly  because of precommitment  or fixed costs. 
Campbell  and  Deaton and  many  others have found  that  consumption 
appears  to exhibit  "excess smoothness"  with respect  to changes  in per- 
manent  income.76  Figure 10 suggests  that the results of table  7 could be 
reconciled with the results of tables 5 and 6 if there is also "excess 
smoothness"  of consumption  with respect  to changes  in unemployment 
expectations. It would not be surprising  if a common explanation  for 
both kinds of excess smoothness existed. One possibility  is given by a 
model of Ricardo  Caballero.77  He interprets  it as a model of near-ratio- 
nality,  but  it could  just as easily be interpreted  as one in which  even non- 
durable  consumption  spending  has fixed  adjustment  costs. He finds  that 
such a model can generate  excess smoothness  of consumption  with re- 
spect to shocks to permanent  income. Such  a model  would  also generate 
excess smoothness  with respect to changes  in uncertainty,  thus provid- 
ing at least a potential  for a joint explanation  of both kinds of excess 
smoothness. 
Another  possible explanation  is habit  formation  in consumption,  as 
suggested  by James  Dusenberry,  John  Heaton, George  Constantinides, 
and  others.78  Casual  observation  convinces me that  it is not uncommon 
even for  freshly  minted  economics  Ph.D.  's to be slow to adjust  their  con- 
76. Campbell  and  Deaton  (1989). 
77. Caballero  (1992). 
78. See, for  example,  Dusenberry  (1949),  Heaton  (1990),  and  Constantinides  (1990). 110  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
sumption  to a level commensurate  with their income after beginning  a 
professional  career. 
A few pieces of evidence on these topics are given by the last three 
regressions  of table  7. The idea here  is to choose categories  of consump- 
tion that a priori  seem less subject  to precommitment  or fixed costs of 
adjustment,  and to see whether  the MU term  is less significant  for such 
components.  Among  the broad  aggregates  of consumption,  nondurables 
spending  is probably  easier  to adjust  than  services consumption;  regres- 
sion 5 shows that the expected change in unemployment  is less signifi- 
cant in explaining  nondurables  consumption  than for nondurables  and 
services combined. Disaggregating  further within nondurable  goods, 
food seems a good candidate  for a category  of spending  that can be ad- 
justed quickly;  indeed, regression  6 shows that  the coefficient  on unem- 
ployment  expectations  is about  as significant  in explaining  food expendi- 
tures as in explaining  total nondurable  spending. Within the services 
category, "recreational  services" includes movie and theater tickets 
and  a host of other  categories  of spending  that,  plausibly,  are  discretion- 
ary; regression  7 shows that there is no significant  evidence that recre- 
ational services grow more slowly when unemployment  expectations 
are predictably  high. 
This is tenuous evidence. However, in combination  with the earlier 
evidence that  the saving  rate  rises when unemployment  expectations  in- 
crease, it suggests that the reaction of most categories of nondurables 
and services consumption  to an increase in uncertainty  is roughly as 
shown in the "moving average consumption  path" in figure  9: slower 
consumption  growth  and higher  saving  for at least a few quarters. 
The tests of this section are  particularly  interesting  because of the na- 
ture of the evidence they provide  against  other models. In the past ten 
years, most rejections  of the permanent-income  hypothesis using mac- 
roeconomic  data  have been interpreted  as resulting  from  a failure  of con- 
sumers  to be sufficiently  forward-looking,  or from  the existence of bind- 
ing liquidity  constraints.  The results of this section, however, suggest 
that  consumers  are both forward-looking  and able to adjust  their  saving 
in response to perceptions  about the future, but that they are forward- 
looking  in a different  (and,  for that  matter,  more  sophisticated)  way than 
postulated  by simple  certainty-equivalence  models. 
The fundamental  message of these results and those of the previous 
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cyclical behavior  of consumption  and saving. Models that do not allow 
separate  effects for the future  level of income and for the degree of un- 
certainty  about future income (particularly  uncertainty  about employ- 
ment)  seem to miss important  features  of the data. 
Applying the Results 
This final  section considers  whether  the buffer-stock  model  can shed 
some light on two case studies that represent  puzzles for more tradi- 
tional models of consumption  and saving. The first  puzzle is the much- 
analyzed decline in the personal saving rate over the past fifteen to 
twenty years. I argue  that two important  culprits  may be the decline in 
the growth  rate  of personal  income  and  the relaxation  of borrowing  stan- 
dards  that began in the late 1970s.  The second puzzle is why consump- 
tion growth has been so weak very recently. Using models similar  to 
those estimated  in the previous  section, I argue  that  continuing  (and  jus- 
tified)  pessimism  about  unemployment  accounts  for a substantial  part  of 
the weakness. 
The Secular Decline  in the Personal  Saving Rate 
Figure 11  displays  U.S. personal  saving  as a fraction  of personal  dis- 
posable  income since 1960.  A host of studies  has tried  to explain  the sec- 
ular  decline in the saving  rate that began sometime  in the mid-1970s.  A 
literature  spawned by Martin  Feldstein emphasizes the importance  of 
the increased  generosity of the Social Security system, which reduces 
the need to save for retirement.79  Others  have cited demographic  effects 
of the baby  boom  generation,80  the changing  behavior  of pension  plans,8' 
the effect of increases  in household  net worth,82  reduced  bequest saving 
by the elderly,83  and  a host of other  factors. No consensus has emerged. 
In the third  section, I showed  that  the personal  saving  rate  in a buffer- 
stock model will tend toward  s* = gw*. The buffer-stock  model there- 
79. Feldstein  (1974). 
80. Bovenberg  and  Evans  (1989). 
81. Bernheim  and  Shoven  (1988). 
82. Wilcox(1991). 
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Figure  11. U.S. Personal  Saving  Rate, 1960:1-1992:2 
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Source:  Author's calculations  using NIPA.  NIPA definitions of saving were used.  Vertical lines represent NBER- 
dated business  cycle  peaks.  Figure plots quarterly data as a centered  three-quarter moving average. 
fore  suggests  two natural categories  of explanations  for the long-term 
decline  in s: a fall in g or a fall in w*. I will first consider  whether the 
falling personal income growth rate can explain the drop in the personal 
saving rate, and, next, whether various trends in the economy  may have 
reduced  w*. Leading candidates  are a reduction in household  income 
uncertainty because  of the increasing prevalence  of two-earner house- 
holds, and a relaxation of borrowing constraints following financial de- 
regulation in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
FALLING  INCOME  GROWTH  AND  THE  SAVING  RATE.  From 1960 to 
1980, the annual growth rate of per capita personal income in the United 
States was about 2.5 percent, yet from 1980 to 1991, the growth rate was 
only about halfcas  large, at 1.  3 percent. The average personal saving rate 
was 7.3 percent in the earlier period and 6.0 percent in the latter period. 
Although  low growth  is often blamed  on low saving, it is possible in a 
buffer-stock  model  for the causality  to go in the opposite direction:  slow 
growth  can cause low saving.  This is a surprising  result  because in a tra- 
ditional  LC/PIH  model, lower income growth  implies  lower lifetime  in- 
come, lower consumption,  and  hence higher  saving  rates. Christopher D.  Carroll  113 
First I must show that it is theoretically  possible for lower growth  to 
lead  to a lower saving  rate. Formally,  the question  is whether  the deriva- 
tive of the target  personal  saving  rate  with  respect  to g is positive or neg- 
ative: 
(10)  ~~~ds*  _d  dw*  (10)  ds*  - gw*  = w* + g  w 
At g = 0, the second term  on the right  hand  side vanishes. So starting 
at an income growth  rate of zero, it is clear that if w* is positive, an in- 
crease in the growth  rate of income must increase the personal saving 
rate. However, there is no guarantee  that the relationship  between sav- 
ing and  growth  is positive for all values of g because the optimal  buffer 
stock is smaller  when income growth is faster. (See the discussion of 
figure  4 and  table 3 in the third  section.) Thus dw*ldg  is negative. 
Away from g = 0, therefore,  the sign of equation 10 is theoretically 
ambiguous  and must  be determined  by numerical  solution  of the model. 
Referring  again  to table 3, we can calculate  that  the target  personal  sav- 
ing rate gw* is zero at g = 0; 0.02 times 0.44 -  0.9 percent  at g = 0.02; 
and  0.04 times 0.37 z 1.5  percent  at g = 0.04. Thus  under  the parameter 
values chosen here, the relationship  between  income  growth  and  the tar- 
get saving  rate is positive between g = 0 and  g = 0.04. However, these 
same calculations  show that the model is not quantitatively  capable  of 
explaining  the entire  decline  in the U.S. personal  saving  rate. The differ- 
ence in the saving  rate at g = 0 and at g = 2 percent  was only 0.9 per- 
cent. So a change in income growth  of 2 percent, almost twice as large 
as the actual 1.2  percent  change,  generates  a change  in the saving  rate  of 
only 0.9 percent, slightly  smaller  than the actual  change  of 1.3 percent. 
Under  the base parameter  values, therefore,  the buffer-stock  model im- 
plies that the drop in income growth  can at most account for a bit less 
than  half  the decline in the personal  saving  rate  in the 1980s. 
The basic reason  that  the model  cannot  explain  the entire  drop  in sav- 
ing is that the target  net wealth  ratio  w* is not large  enough. If in reality 
consumers are more risk averse, or have a lower discount rate, or for 
any other reason have a higher  w*, then the model would be able to ex- 
plain  more  of the decline  in saving  as the result  of the decline  in growth.84 
84. I have  concentrated  here  on long-run  comparisons  of saving  rates  across  target  ra- 
tios, rather  than  the short-term  dynamics  of the saving  rate, because the short-term  dy- 
namics  go the wrong  way:  the short-term  reaction  to a decline  in the  growth  rate  of income 
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EVIDENCE  FOR  REDUCED  TARGET  WEALTH.  Before turning to the 
evidence on factors that may have reduced  the target  net wealth ratio, 
w*, it may be useful to review the short-term  and long-term  effects of 
such a reduction.  Suppose  that  in period  T  a change  in the economic en- 
vironment  occurs (say, a sudden and permanent  loosening of liquidity 
constraints)  that results in a lower target  for net wealth; after  period T, 
no further  changes in the environment  occur. Relative to their new tar- 
get, consumers  now hold too much net wealth. The result could color- 
fully be described  as a consumption  binge:  there  will be a sudden  sharp 
increase in consumption  and a sharp  decline in the saving rate as con- 
sumers  begin to spend  down their  net wealth toward  the new target.  As 
the binge  period  wears off (and  net wealth  declines), the saving  rate  will 
gradually  recover somewhat, but its new target  gw* will be lower than 
before the drop  in w*. 
The  analysis  is somewhat  more  difficult  in the case of gradual  changes 
in the economic environment  that slowly reduce w* over time. For in- 
stance, imagine a gradual  decline in income uncertainty.  The easiest 
way to think  of this is to imagine  consumers  going on a small  consump- 
tion binge every year as w* continues to drop slightly  every year. Two 
features of such a scenario are clear: first, the personal saving rate 
should drop over time as w* drops, and, second, if the decline in w* 
stops, the saving  rate should  subsequently  rise somewhat  as consumers 
end their  consumption  binges. Again,  however, the eventual  target  sav- 
ing rate  gw* will be lower than  it was before the decline in w* began. 
Turning  now to factors that  may have reduced  the target  wealth  ratio 
w* over the last twenty years, two broad categories of explanations 
seem worth  investigating:  declines  in income  uncertainty  and  relaxation 
of liquidity  constraints.  I will treat  these in order. 
Declining  income  uncertainty.  One of the most important changes 
in the nature  of household  earnings  process in the past thirty  years has 
been the remarkable  increase in labor force participation  by women. 
The fraction of married  women who are in the labor force increased 
from 30.5 percent in 1960 to 40.8 percent in 1970 to 57.8 percent in 
1989.85  The household  income of a typical  (two wage-earner)  household 
today is therefore  probably  less uncertain  than that of a typical (one 
85. StatisticalAbstract  of the United  States, 1991  (table  643, col. 1, p. 391). Christopher D.  Carroll  115 
wage-earner)  household  twenty  or thirty  years ago because it is unlikely 
that both husband and wife would lose their jobs at the same time. 
Eventually,  of course, this trend  must end, because female labor  force 
participation  cannot exceed  100 percent. It is  not clear, however, 
whether  the trend  has ended yet. 
A second development is the expansion of insurance. (Insurance 
reduces the need for precautionary  saving by reducing uncertainty.) 
The buffer-stock  model would suggest that unemployment  insurance 
may be particularly  important;  in fact, the unemployment  insurance 
program  was expanded considerably  during  the 1970s. In 1972 about 
18 percent of workers were not covered by unemployment  insurance; 
since reforms  in the late 1970s,  all but about  3 percent  of the workforce 
has been covered.86  The model would predict that as the program 
became more comprehensive,  the need for buffer wealth should have 
declined, and thus the personal saving rate should have declined. The 
saving rate did indeed decline fairly sharply  in the late 1970s,  although 
the timing of the decline did not coincide exactly with changes in 
unemployment  insurance. The model would also predict that as the 
changes in the program  came to an end, the saving rate should rise, as 
it did in the early 1980s.  The final  prediction  would be that the average 
level of the saving rate in the new equilibrium  should be lower than 
before the expansion  in the system. Indeed  the average  personal  saving 
rate since the early 1980s  has been substantially  lower than  previously. 
Despite the apparent  match between the model and the facts, it 
strains credibility to attribute too much of the pattern of personal 
saving  to the described  changes  in the unemployment  insurance  system. 
Furthermore,  during the 1980s the unemployment  insurance system 
became somewhat  less generous as eligibility  requirements  were tight- 
ened in many states.87  If unemployment  insurance  were the vital force 
driving  the personal saving rate, at least some increase in the saving 
rate should have occurred following these changes. However, the 
saving rate in the late 1980s continued to decline. A balanced view 
might be that the increase in unemployment insurance is probably 
responsible  for a modest part  of the decline in saving, but by no means 
most of the decline. 
86. U.S. Department  of Labor  (1972,  p. 8) and  Burtless  (1983,  p. 229). 
87. For instance,  the number  of months  workers  are required  to have been employed 
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Another exceptionally important  form of insurance  is health insur- 
ance, which has also expanded  greatly since the 1950s  and 1960s. The 
fraction  of the population  covered by the most common  form of health 
insurance,  hospital  insurance,  rose from  68 percent  in 1960  to 82 percent 
in 1980,  although  it had  fallen  back to 76 percent  by 1985.88  The fraction 
of the average medical bill that was paid directly by the patient (as 
opposed to being paid by insurance)  fell from 55 percent in 1960  to 28 
percent in 1985.89  Thus the expansion of health insurance  could have 
contributed  to the long-term  downward  trend in the personal saving 
rate. Again, however, during  the middle  and late 1980s,  the fraction  of 
the population  covered by health insurance  declined and health insur- 
ance benefits became less generous, so trends in health insurance  are 
not much help in explaining  why saving was particularly  low in the 
1980s. 
A more speculative  possibility  is that  the long expansion  of the 1980s 
and the long decline in the unemployment  rate led consumers  to revise 
doward  their estimated probability  of unemployment  or the estimated 
variance  of income shocks. Certainly  the depth and duration  of the re- 
cent recession came as a surprise  to consumers  and  economists alike. If 
consumers  become permanently  more  pessimistic  about  the unemploy- 
ment  rate, this could  lead to some recovery in the saving  rate  in both the 
short  run and the long run as w* is revised up. The next section of the 
paper  considers whether  this phenomenon  might  be partly  responsible 
for the exceptional  weakness of consumption  growth  recently. 
Relaxation  of  borrowing  constraints.  Although  the  buffer-stock 
model described formally above does not incorporate  liquidity con- 
straints,  the last part  of the third  section argued  that  a model  with  explicit 
liquidity constraints could exhibit behavior very similar to that de- 
scribed  for the model presented  here. Fundamentally,  I view the model 
with explicit liquidity constraints as an alternative  and slightly more 
complex manifestation  of the buffer-stock model, rather than as a 
separate and competing model. The most important  reason to model 
liquidity constraints explicitly is to be able to analyze what happens 
when constraints  are relaxed. But, as I argued  above, the basic qualita- 
88. Health  Insurance  Association  of America  (1987,  p. 10). 
89. See Summers  and  Carroll  (1987,  p. 628). Christopher D.  Carroll  117 
Table  8. Types  of Debt Relative  to Disposable  Income,  1961-90 
Ratio 
Other 
Time  Total  Mortgage  Installment  consumer  Other 
period  debt  debt  credit  credit  debt 
1961-65  0.68  0.45  0.14  0.05  0.04 
1966-70  0.71  0.45  0.16  0.05  0.05 
1971-75  0.70  0.44  0.17  0.04  0.05 
1976-80  0.73  0.48  0.17  0.03  0.05 
1981-85  0.76  0.51  0.16  0.03  0.06 
1986-90  0.89  0.62  0.20  0.02  0.05 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using  data  from  Federal  Reserve  Board,  Balance  Sheets  for the U.S. Economy,  and 
NIPA. Other  debt is total  debt minus  mortgage  debt, installment  credit,  and  consumer  credit. 
tive result is clear: when liquidity constraints are relaxed, impatient 
buffer-stock  consumers  will borrow  more and will have a lower target 
wealth. Relying on this admittedly rather loose  description of the 
liquidity  constrained  version of the model, I will proceed to argue  that 
part of the decline in the personal saving rate since the late 1970s  has 
been caused by a relaxation  of borrowing  constraints  and a consequent 
increase in debt. 
During  the 1980s  debt certainly  did increase.  Table  8 provides  details 
of the changes by debt category since the 1960s. The ratio of total 
liabilities to income crept up by about 0.3 percentage points a year 
between 1961-65  and 1976-80. That  ratio  grew by about 1.5 percentage 
points a year between 1976-80 and 1986-90. 
This rapid  growth  of debt concided with a comprehensive  liberaliza- 
tion and deregulation  of financial  markets. Casual evidence suggests 
that  credit  became easier to get and  that  repayment  terms  became more 
lenient. For example, the fraction of households owning at least one 
bank credit card increased from 16 percent in 1970 to 54 percent in 
1989.9  The average  length  of new car  loans increased  steadily,  from  37.6 
months  in 1975  to 54.6 months  in 1990.9'  The average  down payment  as 
a fraction  of house value  for  first-time  home  buyers  declined  from 18  per- 
cent in 1976  to 11.4  percent  in 1985.92 
90. Canner  and  Luckett  (1992,  p. 656). 
91. Federal  Reserve Statistical  Release, G19, "Consumer  Installment  Credit,"  vari- 
ous releases. 
92. Statistical  Abstract  of the United  States (1987,  table 1293,  p. 716). 118  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Figure  12. Delinquency  Rates  for Several  Categories  of Consumer  Debt 
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The natural inference is that liberalizy  eate  o at least partly responsi- 
ble for the increase in debt. Hallowance de  froth  could instead reflect 
demographic factors,  such as the beginning of home purchases  by the 
baby boom generation,  or portfolio shifts in which households chose 
to hold both more assets and more debt, or a number  of other factors. 
The best proof that consumers  who were poorer credit risks have had 
increased  access to credit is therefore  evidence about the incidence of 
delinquency, default, or other nonpayment  of debt. Figure 12 shows 
the fraction  of mortgages  whose payments  were delinquent  by 90 days 
or more since 1955.  This figure  trended  steadily upward  from the early 
1970s  to the mid-1980s.93  Figure  12  tells a similar  story  for delinquencies 
on auto loans and shows higher  delinquency  rates for bank  credit  cards 
93. The peak  around  1985  occurred  because  of the regional  recession  in oil-producing 
regions  of the  country  and  thus  may  not  be directly  related  to a trend  toward  higher  average 
default  rates. However,  even after  allowance  is made  for this  factor,  a clear  upward  trend 
in delinquencies  appears  between  the early 1970s  and  the mid-  to late 1980s. Christopher D.  Carroll  119 
in the mid-1980s  and early 1990s than at any other time in the data 
sample. Data on other delinquency  rates, foreclosure rates, personal 
bankruptcies,  and other measures confirm  the impression that in the 
mid- to late 1980s, debt repayment  problems  increased substantially. 
Financial  intermediaries  may have had several reasons to increase 
their willingness to lend to questionable  borrowers  in the 1980s. The 
first is the perverse incentives that eventually led to the savings and 
loan crisis: because deposits were insured,  owners of savings and loan 
institutions  (S&L's) had every incentive to make risky loans. Broadly 
speaking, if the loans paid off, the S&L owners profited;  if the loans 
failed, the government took the loss.  It is  clear that S&L's made 
very risky loans to commercial  borrowers. S&L's also substantially 
expanded  their market  presence in unsecured  consumer  lending  in the 
mid-1980s.  Mortgages,  however, were the bread-and-butter  business of 
S&L's, and  through  the mid-  to late 1980s,  S&L's continued  to originate 
approximately  60 percent  of home mortgages.  Even a modest  relaxation 
of lending standards  by S&L's could therefore  have made a big differ- 
ence in this market. On the other hand, the evidence is not clear 
whether the new S&L's mortgage loans from this period were any 
riskier than mortgage  loans made by banks in the same period. Most 
of the riskiest lending  by S&L's was to the commercial  sector, not to 
homeowners. 
Another  important  development  was the expansion  of the mortgage- 
backed securities markets  facilitated  by government  agencies such as 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage  Corporation,  the Federal National 
Mortgage  Association, and  the Government  National  Mortgage  Associ- 
ation. The increased liquidity of mortgage loans provided by these 
agencies apparently  allowed banks to relax credit standards  for loans 
they originated.  The banks could then bundle the loans together and 
sell them to investors, thus avoiding some of the risk associated with 
mortgage  lending. 
Several  other  factors  may  have  played  a role. One  important  develop- 
ment was that improvements  in information  technology made it easier 
to  swap information  on prospective borrowers. Marco Pagano and 
Tullio Jappelli  report that the number  of credit reports grew from 60 
million  in 1960  to 100  million  in 1970  to 400 million  in 1990.94  Standard 
94. Pagano  and  Jappelli  (1991,  p. 27). 120  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
models of credit rationing,  such as that of Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew 
Weiss, rely on the lender's  inability  to distinguish  between "good" and 
"bad" borrowers.95  Such models can generate outcomes in which the 
lender will not lend at all if he cannot distinguish  between good and 
bad borrowers.  However, if he can distinguish  between borrowers,  he 
will lend to the good borrowers at low interest rates and the bad 
borrowers  at high  interest  rates. Therefore,  if the improvement  of credit 
reporting  technologies  made  distinguishing  between  good and  bad  credit 
risks easier, credit should have become more accessible to everyone. 
Such information  technology developments  probably  were one of the 
factors behind the deluge of credit card applications that began ap- 
pearing  with great  regularity  in many  people's mailboxes  in the mid-  to 
late 1980s. 
Whatever  the reason for looser credit, in an economy populated  by 
buffer-stock consumers who face  borrowing constraints, loosening 
those constraints should reduce the saving rate in both the short run 
and the long run. Easier credit may be the most plausible  explanation 
for the low saving rate of the 1980s. If this explanation  is correct, the 
saving  rate should  recover somewhat  (although  not to its original  level) 
when credit  stops loosening. In fact, many  of the trends  that apparently 
led to the loosening  of credit  during  the 1980s  had  either  halted  or begun 
to reverse by late 1989 or 1990, around the beginning  of the "credit 
crunch." Perhaps  not coincidentally,  the personal  saving  rate has been 
gradually  improving  since that time, averaging  4 percent in 1989, 4.3 
percent in 1990,  4.7 percent in 1991,  and 5.2 percent in the first  half of 
1992. However, interpretation  of recent movements in the saving rate 
is complicated  by the fact that the economy has been in recession. 
Precautionary  Saving and the Recent Recession 
The flip  side of the increasing  saving  rate  recently  has been slow con- 
sumption  growth. In particular,  consumption  growth  has been remark- 
ably lackluster  since the trough96  of the recent recession.97  A common 
95. Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981). 
96. Although  the NBER  dating  committee  has not yet met at the time  of this writing,  I 
will assume  that  the trough  will eventually  be dated  as the second  quarter  of 1991. 
97. This  claim  is supported  by the  fact  that  macroeconomic  models  and  economic  fore- 
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theme  of press discussion  of the weakness  in consumption  has been that 
"debt overhang"  from  the 1980s  has been restraining  consumer  spend- 
ing. The discussion  just concluded  confirmed  that in the 1980s  the ratio 
of consumer  debt to personal  consumption  did rise at an unprecedented 
rate. Furthermore,  the rapid  growth  in the debt ratio  ended near  the be- 
ginning  of 1990,  and  the economy slipped  into recession soon after. 
What  often remains  unexamined  is why a level of debt that was ac- 
ceptable  in 1989  and  was freely chosen by consumers  at that  time  consti- 
tuted "debt overhang"  in 1990  or 1991.  The natural  explanation  in the 
buffer-stock  framework  is that the target level of net worth has in- 
creased, making  consumers uncomfortable  with levels of wealth that 
seemed adequate  in happier  times. In particular,  the two characteristic 
features  of recessions-a  low income growth  rate g and a higher  unem- 
ployment  rate-should both  increase  to the target  level of wealth.  Which 
feature  is more important  will depend on the parameters  of the model, 
but the simulations  above showed that  under  the parameter  values used 
here, the target wealth ratio was considerably more sensitive to the 
probability  of unemployment  than  to the growth  rate of income. 
The regressions  of tables,  5 and  6 suggest  that  both effects occur: sav- 
ing is higher  when future  income growth  is low and when prospects  for 
employment  are low. However, those regressions  have direct implica- 
tions only for net worth, and  not explicitly  for debt. The problem  is that 
changes  in debt could  just represent  portfolio  shifts  if, for instance,  most 
changes  in debt happened  because consumers  paid  off debts by drawing 
down assets, rather  than  saving  more. 
To gain some insight  on consumer  attitudes  toward  debt, the Univer- 
sity of Michigan  Surveys of Consumers  ask another interesting  ques- 
tion: "If there  were something  that  you wanted  to buy, do you think  that 
now is a time when it would  be okay to buy it on credit, or is now a time 
when you would be especially reluctant  to take on new debt?"98  This 
question  is similar  to the one on saving  reported  above, but the answers 
are at least potentially  different.  In fact, regressions  4 through  6 of table 
5 show that  attitudes  toward  debt are  broadly  similar  to attitudes  toward 
saving:  consumers  are reluctant  to increase debt when they expect un- 
employment  to rise. However, the relationship  between expected in- 
come growth  and attitudes  toward  debt is much  weaker. 
98. University  of Michigan,  Surveys of Consumers, various  years. 122  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
Figure  13. Expected  Unemployment  Index 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  based  on  University  of  Michigan,  Surveys  of Consumers  (1992).  Index  is  equal  to 
the  percent  of  consumers  who  expect  unemployment  to  rise  minus  the  percent  who  expect  unemployment  to  fall, 
multiplied  by  100.  See  table  S  for  a  further  explanation.  Vertical  lines  represent  NBER-dated  business  cycle  peaks 
and  troughs.  The  1991  trough  was  estimated  by  the  author  as  1991:2. 
This  analysis  suggests  that,  to  the  extent  that a  "debt  overhang" 
problem has existed,  the problem is not so much the debt itself as that 
consumers'9  expectations  have changed  in ways that  made  them  uncom- 
fortable holding the debt that they had voluntarily assumed previously. 
The regressions of tables 5 and 6 strongly suggest looking at unemploy- 
ment expectations.- Thus figure 13 plots the unemployment expectations 
index over time, along with NBER  business  cycle  peaks and troughs. 
Although the index did not display especially unusual behavior in the be- 
ginning of the most recent recession,  it has failed to drop steeply  since 
the trough, as it usually has after previous recessions.  This is strongly 
suggestive,  because  forecasts  of consumption  did not begi n to go seri- 
ously off track until the trough.99 
99. For the MPS model, for example, consumption  growth began to go off track 
around  the beginning  of the recession, but  the model  began  making  large  errors  only after 
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Table  9. Average  Forecast  Errors  for the Campbell-Mankiw  Model  and the Augmented 
Campbell-Mankiw  Model  since  the Last Business  Cycle  Peaka 
Average  Average 
residuals  residuals 
Forecast  Dependent  since peak,  since trough, 
typeb  variable  Model  1990:3-1992:2  1991:2-1992.2 
Out-of-sample  Ac  Campbell-Mankiw  -0.57  - 0.37 
Out-of-sample  Ac  Augmented  -0.48  -0.25 
Out-of-sample  Acns  Campbell-Mankiw  -0.52  -0.42 
Out-of-sample  Acns  Augmented  -0.46  -0.34 
Out-of-sample  Acd  Campbell-Mankiw  -0.86  -0.02 
Out-of-sample  Acd  Augmented  -0.62  0.29 
In-sample  Ac  Campbell-Mankiw  -0.49  -0.49 
In-sample  Ac  Augmented  -0.29  - 0.22 
In-sample  Acns  Campbell-Mankiw  -0.46  - 0.48 
In-sample  Acns  Augmented  -0.31  -0.28 
In-sample  Acd  Campbell-Mankiw  -0.68  -0.49 
In-sample  Acd  Augmented  - 0.22  0.14 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using data from the University  of Michigan,  Surveys  of Consumers,  and NIPA. 
Variables  are  defined  as in table  7, except  for cd, which  is defined  as log total  real  expenditure  on consumer  durables 
(including  clothing). 
a. This table  is read  as follows. The first  line indicates  that  the Campbell-Mankiw  model  (Campbell  and Mankiw, 
1989),  whose parameters  were  estimated  on data  from 1961:1  through  1990:2,  overpredicted  consumption  growth  by 
an average  of 0.57 percent  per quarter  in the period  from 1990:3  to 1992:2,  and by 0.37 percent  per  quarter  over the 
period  from 1991:2  to 1992:2.  The next line indicates  that the augmented  model  overpredicted  on average  by 0.48 
percent  and  0.25 percent,  respectively,  over the same period. 
b. "Out-of-sample"  designates  forecasts  made  with model  parameter  values estimated  on the period  before the 
peak  of the latest  business  cycle. "In-sample"  designates  forecasts  made  with  model  parameters  estimated  using  the 
entire  sample  through  1992:2. 
To look more rigorously  at the role of pessimism  about employment 
conditions  in the recent  weakness of consumption  growth,  I reestimated 
the models reported  in table 7 for total consumption  and nondurables 
and  services consumption;  I then  estimated  a similar  model  for durables 
spending. I estimated the models through  the second quarter  of 1990 
(the quarter  before the peak) and then used them to predict consump- 
tion on a rolling  basis through  the second quarter  of 1992.  (The estima- 
tion results were very similar  to those reported  in table 7, so I did not 
report  them.)  The first  panel  of table  9 shows that  the straight  Campbell- 
Mankiw  model  overpredicted  consumption  growth  by an  average  of 0.57 
percent per quarter  since the peak in 1990:3,  and by 0.37 percent per 
quarter  since the trough  of the recession in 1991:2.  By comparison,  the 
augmented  model, which  includes  the unemployment  expectations  vari- 
able, overpredicted  by an average  of 0.48 percent  per quarter  since the 
peak, but  only 0.25  percent  per quarter  since the trough.  Thus, in a crude 124  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
sense, it might  be fair  to say that  consumer  pessimism  about  unemploy- 
ment accounts for about  one-third  of the error  in the forecast of growth 
in total  consumption  spending  of the standard  Campbell-Mankiw  model. 
The  next part  of table  9 shows how the two models  performed  for non- 
durables and services spending and for durables spending. The aug- 
mented model performed  slightly  better in predicting  nondurables  and 
services consumption, and performed  far better in predicting  durable 
goods spending.  Indeed, while the standard  model underpredicts  dura- 
bles spending  substantially,  the augmented  model  overpredicts  durables 
spending. This suggests that, controlling for consumers' pessimism 
about unemployment, durables spending has actually been stronger 
than  would have been anticipated. 
The next part  of table  9 performs  a similar  analysis, but  uses versions 
of the models estimated through  the end of the sample in 1992:2.  As 
should be expected, the in-sample  forecasts are somewhat  better than 
the out-of-sample  forecasts. For total consumption  expenditures, the 
augmented  model's  average  error  in the period  since the peak  is less than 
half the Campbell-Mankiw  model's average  error. 
It is tempting  to draw the conclusion that lingering  consumer  pessi- 
mism  is the cause of the recent  weakness of the economy. However, the 
pessimism has turned  out to be justified:  unemployment  remains  stub- 
bornly  high  and  has even increased  substantially  since the trough.  There 
are  two possible extreme  interpretations  of these events. The first  is that 
consumer expectations are largely determined  by random  shocks, but 
that  expectations  turn  out to be correct  because they constitute  self-ful- 
filling  prophecies.  Pessimism  leads to low spending,  which  in turn  gener- 
ates layoffs. Thus  in the end, the pessimism  turns  out to have been  justi- 
fied. The second extreme possibility is that the future unemployment 
rate is autonomous  and unaffected  by current  consumption  shocks. If 
consumers  are rational  and  forward-looking,  however, current  changes 
in consumption  will anticipate subsequent changes in unemployment 
without  being the underlying  cause of those changes, in the same way 
that one's decision about  whether  to bring  an umbrella  to work may be 
a good forecast  of whether  it rains,  but certainly  does not cause the rain. 
Although  there  are probably  elements  of truth  in both interpretations,  it 
is difficult  to know which is a better description  of the recent behavior 
of the economy. 
A small  clue may have been provided  by the events following  the end Christopher D.  Carroll  125 
of the Persian  Gulf  War  in the spring  of 1991,  when a surge  of consumer 
confidence  and  consumer  spending  occurred  for several  months. If ever 
there were a  natural experiment to  determine whether exogenous 
shocks to consumption  can generate  subsequent  economic growth  suf- 
ficient  to sustain  and  justify the original  consumption  shock, this was it. 
But by the fall of 1991, it was clear that the spending  of the previous 
spring  had  not generated  enough  new employment  and  income  to sustain 
a normal  recovery. The economy began  to struggle  again,  and  consumer 
confidence collapsed. Although not conclusive, this experience sug- 
gests that the recent weakness in consumption  growth is largely a ra- 
tional reaction to justified pessimism about continuing high unem- 
ployment. 
Directions for Future Research 
Uncertainty  about future income has been largely left out of much 
macroeconomic  analysis  of consumption  and saving, in part  because no 
convenient model existed that could analyze uncertainty.  This paper 
shows that the buffer-stock  model can be used effectively to explain a 
variety of macroeconomic  phenomena,  both at the cyclical frequency 
and over longer  time spans. The model implies  in particular  that  the un- 
employment  rate, or expectations  about  the future  unemployment  rate, 
may be quite  important  in determining  current  consumption  and saving 
behavior, because unemployment  fears are likely to be the most im- 
portant  component  of uncertainty  in overall  household  income. The em- 
pirical  results  confirm  that  consumers'  self-reported  expectations  about 
the unemployment  rate are closely associated with the level of saving 
and  the growth  rate  of consumption.  Although  the correlations  between 
consumption  growth and unemployment  expectations do not conform 
to the strict  interpretation  of the model, if consumption  does not adjust 
instantaneously  to changing  unemployment  expectations, even these 
correlations  can be explained  as roughly  consistent  with the model. 
The model also provides several  explanations  for the drop  in the per- 
sonal saving  rate  in the 1980s:  lower income growth,  greater  income se- 
curity,  and  easier borrowing.  Of these, easier  borrowing  seems likely to 
have been the most important.  Finally, the model can explain  why over 
time horizons  of a few years or more, consumption  growth  and income 126  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
growth  move so closely together.  If consumers  have a target  net wealth- 
to-income ratio, in the long run, consumption  growth must match in- 
come growth;  otherwise the net wealth-to-income  ratio  would explode 
or implode. 
The  buffer-stock  model  does not, of course, explain  all behavior  of all 
consumers.  Some consumers  accumulate  very large  amounts  of wealth; 
neither  the buffer-stock  model  nor  any traditional  consumption-smooth- 
ing model is likely to explain the behavior of these consumers. Many 
other consumers  do engage in some form of life-cycle saving  behavior, 
particularly  as they approach  retirement.  Recall, however, that the re- 
quired  condition for buffer-stock  saving in the infinite  horizon buffer- 
stock model was p- I (r -  6) < g. Although  in a finite  horizon  model the 
condition  is more  complex, this equation  provides  the correct  intuition: 
whether buffer-stock saving behavior will occur depends on the ex- 
pected future  growth  rate of income. If expected income growth  is high 
early in life but lower (or negative) as retirement  approaches,  it is en- 
tirely possible that consumers  will engage in buffer-stock  saving when 
young but, after a certain  age, will switch to more traditional  life-cycle 
saving  behavior  as their  expected future  income growth  falls. 
The buffer-stock  model presented  here calls for a variety of further 
work, both theoretical  and empirical.  On the theoretical  side, it would 
be desirable  to develop the model with a choice of assets. For instance, 
consumers are able to make long-term  but illiquid  investments with a 
high rate of return  such as housing. I would speculate that some set of 
parameter  values can accommodate such behavior, predicting  long- 
term  investment  in housing  alongside  buffer-stock  behavior  with  respect 
to short-term  fluctuations  in income. Whether  those parameter  values 
would  be plausible  is hard  to know  in advance.  Another  interesting  theo- 
retical  question  is whether  formally  adding  habit  formation  or  fixed  costs 
of adjustment  to consumption can explain the fact that the average 
growth rate of consumption  is negatively related to the level of unem- 
ployment  expectations.  Again, the answer  is likely to depend  on param- 
eter values. 
On the empirical  side, a great  deal more work could be done to flesh 
out the time-series  relationship  between saving, consumption,  and un- 
employment  expectations.  This may  be a difficult  task  because of the re- 
verse causality problem, but that has not prevented a substantial  re- 
search  program  on consumption  and  income  expectations  in the last few Christopher  D. Carroll  127 
years. A careful  analysis  of the University  of Michigan  Surveys  of Con- 
sumers data on income expectations and unemployment  expectations 
would also be interesting.  It would be useful to know whether  these se- 
ries satisfy constraints  that represent  a rational  expectations  formation 
process. A substantial  opportunity  also exists for research  using  micro- 
economic data. In a 1992  paper, Andrew Samwick  and I, for instance, 
find that households that face greater income uncertainty  hold more 
assets, and in approximately  the ways predicted by the buffer-stock 
model.  ?? Another  type of useful microeconomic  research  would be to 
provide  a more  detailed  and  careful  description  than  provided  in the sec- 
ond section about  the stochastic  process for household  income, particu- 
larly around  episodes of unemployment.  In sum, a host of interesting 
questions remain  about  both the theoretical  and empirical  implications 
of the model. 
APPENDIX 
A. Estimating the Variance of Transitory and Permanent Shocks 
When the Transitory Shock Is Not Independently  Identically 
Distributed 
The first section of the paper  assumes that the level of the transitory 
component  of income is identically  independently  distributed  (iid). The 
assumption  that the level is iid implies  that thefirst difference  of log in- 
come should follow an MA(1) serial correlation  process (because the 
transitory  change in income this period should reverse itself next per- 
iod). The estimates  of John  Abowd and David Card'0l  and Thomas  Ma- 
Curdy'02  are consistent with an MA(1) serial correlation  process in the 
first  difference,  but both papers  prefer  an MA(2)  to an MA(1)  serial  cor- 
relation. Hence, the assumption  of an uncorrelated  transitory  compo- 
nent in levels is probably  not strictly  correct. 
Fortunately,  the decomposition  methodology described in the text 
can be easily extended to the case of a transitory  error that is MA(q) 
100. Carroll  and  Samwick  (1992). 
101. Abowd  and  Card  (1989). 
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serially  correlated  rather  than iid.  103  Suppose In V, is MA(q). For nota- 
tional  convenience  call  rm =  ln  YLt+m -  ln  YL,. Then  var  (rm) = 
m  2InN +  2 ain V still holds for any m >  q because cov (ln Vt+m,  ln V,) = 
0. So long as the data contain  at least q + 2 years of data, it will still be 
possible to solve two linear  equations  for 
U2  N and  U2, V 
If there are T +  q years of data, there are (7  -  1) potential  m's and 
(7 -  2) potential  different  estimates  of 02  N and  ur  V  Assuming  that the 
serial  correlation  properties  of income are constant  through  time, each 
individual  estimate is consistent, but greater  efficiency is obtained by 
averaging  the separate  estimates of U2,  V and U2N  Suppose q =  2 and 
X  =  8. Call the vector of calculated variances v  =  [var(r3),  .. 
var(r10)]'.  In a linear regression of v on a constant and the vector (3, 
4, ...  10)', the coefficient  on the constant  term  should  be 2u  2 v and the 
coefficient on the count term should be U2InN. This is the methodology 
actually  used for estimating  U2  V  and  Uj2  N*104 
B. Deriving the Optimal Policy Rule for Consumption 
The model presented  in the third  section is solved using backwards 
recursion  on the period-by-period  Euler  equations  to derive  a numerical 
optimal consumption rule for periods T-  1, T-  2,.  .  . T -  n.'05  Optimal 
consumption  in any  period  will depend  only on the sum  of current  assets 
and current  income, a variable  that  I will call  X, gross wealth, 
Xt =  W, +  YLt, 
where W,  is net wealth and YLt  is noncapital  labor  income. 
The evolution  of gross wealth  over time is given by 
X+I=  R(X,  -  C)  +  YLt+ , 
where Ct  is consumption  at time t and  R is the interest  factor. 
Now consider a consumer solving the finite horizon problem, with 
last period of life T. Because the consumer  is assumed to spend what- 
103. An AR process would  be more  difficult  to address.  However, Abowd  and  Card, 
MaCurdy,  and most other economists  have consistently  rejected  an AR specification  in 
favor  of MA specifications. 
104. As in constructing  the YLRATIO,  the predictable  life-cycle  element  of changes  in 
income  was removed  before  these calculations  were  performed. 
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ever gross  wealth  he has in the last period,  the Euler  equation  for optimal 
consumption  in the period  before  last is 
(B-1)  u'(CT-I)  = RI3ET-I U'(CT) =  R3ET-  I u'(XT), 
where 1 is the discount  factor. 
This equation  is in the levels of C, X, and YL.  The income process is 
given by 
YL, = Pt V, 
Pt+1 =  GPtNt+l, 
where G is the growth  factor  for permanent  income;  N, is the transitory 
shock;  P, is permanent  labor  income;  and  Vt  is a multiplicative  transitory 
shock in year t. 
It would be more convenient  to expresss equation  B-  I in terms  of ra- 
tios to permanent  income  P. To accomplish  this, it is necessary to write 
out the difference  equation  for  xt, the ratio  of Xt  to permanent  income  Pt, 
as a function  of ct, the ratio  of Ct  to permanent  income  Pt: 
Xt+I  =  X,+l/Pt+I 
=  [R(Xt -  Ct) +  YLt+1IIPt+l 
=  [R(xt -  ct)Pt  +  YL,+]IlPt+1 
=  [R(xt -  ct)Pt]IGPtNt+l  +  YLt+/IPt+j 
(B-2)  x,+ I = R(xt -  c)IG N,+ I +  Vt+  1 
This means  that  B-  I can be rewritten  as 
(B-3)  U'(CT-I  PT-I)  =  RIET-I  u'  (XTPT)  =  RET-  I u'(XTGPT-I  NT). 
For a homogeneous  utility function, it is permissible  to divide both 
arguments  by PT-  1 Doing this and substituting  for the value of XT yields 
U'(CT-I)  =  RIET-I  U' {[R(XT-I  -  CTI)G  NT +  VT]  GNT}. 
For any given value of the gross wealth ratio  XT-  1,  this equation  im- 
plicitly defines the optimal  value of the consumption  ratio CT  I(XT  I). 
Now between period T -  1 and T -  2 a similar Euler equation holds: 
U(CT-2)  =  RPET-2 U'(CT-I) 
u  (CT-2  PT-2)  =  R1ET-2  U [CTI(XT-1)  PT-  1] 
U '(CT-2)  = RPET-2 U'{CT1  I[R(XT-2 
-  CT-2)I 
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So this implicitly  defines  CT-2  as a function  of XT-2,  CT-2  (XT-2).  More 
generally, 
(B-4)  u'(c,) = Rf3Et  u'{c,+ [R(xt -  ct)IG  Nt+ I +  Vt+  1] G Nt+ 1}, 
u'(c,) = Rf  Nf  V Uct  {C+I [R(xt -  ct)IG  Nt +I 
+ V,+  I]  G N,+ I}  dF(V)  dF(N). 
The function c,(xt) is defined implicitly by this equation. Because 
there  is no analytical  solution  for c,(xt),  numerical  methods  must  be used 
to solve; for  details  of how the numerical  calculations  are  performed,  see 
my 1992  paper. 06  Thus  the optimal  consumption  rules  are  found  by solv- 
ing successively for CT_I(XT_I),  CT_2(XT_2),  and so on back to the first 
period of life. As illustrated  in figure  3, however, under  the parameter 
values chosen here, the  CT_i functions  converge  rather  quickly;  the func- 
tion they converge  to is designated  c(x). 
C.  Proving That Consumption  Growth Is Higher When 
Wealth Is Lower 
If shocks to consumption  are  lognormally  distributed,  the Euler  equa- 
tion for consumption  growth  is given by: 
(C-1)  AlnC  +C  p-'(r  -  8) +  IpEtvar(AlnCC+1)  +  et+1,  2 
where Ct is consumption;  p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; 
r is the interest  rate;  and  8 is the discount  rate. 
In the text, I asserted that the expected growth  rate of consumption 
will be greater  when wealth  is lower because the conditional  variance  of 
consumption  growth is higher when there is less wealth available to 
buffer  income shocks. I will prove this for the simplified  case where the 
interest  rate  is zero and  income shocks  are  independently  identically  dis- 
tributed, Y =  Y + u, where Yis mean  income and u is an iid mean zero 
error  (there  is no income growth).  In this case, there will be an optimal 
consumption  rule C(X)  that  relates  the level of consumption  to the level 
of gross wealth  X. Define 
(C-2)  Z(X) =  ln C(X) 
o2i  (Xt) =  E, [var (A  ln C,+  I)] = E,{var  [Z(X,+  I) -  Z(X,)]} 
= E,  {var [Z(X,+  1)]}, 
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where  X,+ is the random  variable  representing  the value of gross wealth 
in period  t +  1, and the last equality  is true  because X, is known  at time 
t so that var [Z(X,)]  = 0. Then the task is to prove that d 
a2Z(X,)  <  0, 
the expected variance  of consumption  growth  declines as gross wealth 
increases.  Define F(Xt) =  Et X,+ I =  Xt -  C(X,) +  Y. Then Z(X,+ I) = 
Z[F(Xt)  + u,+  J. Taking  a first  order  Taylor  expansion  yields 
(C-3)  Z(X,_  I) = Z[F(Xt)]  + Z'[F(Xt)]  u+ 1. 
But  because  Z(F[Xt])  is known  at time  t and  has no variance,  it follows 
that 
(C-4)  E,{var  [Z(X,,  + )]}  -  E,  (var  {Z'[F(X,)]  u,  +  l}) = {Z'U[F(X.)]}2o. 
Thus the sign of dd  r2 (X)  will be the same as the sign of dd 
dxtdd  {Z'  [F(Xt)]12. 
(C-5)  d  {Z [F(Xt)]}2  -  2Z' [F(Xt)] d- {Z' [F(Xt)]}. 
dxt  dxt 
Now Z(X) = ln C (X), so Z'(X) = so Z'(X) = C' (X)lC(X),  which will 
always be positive because both the level of consumption  and the mar- 
ginal propensity  to consume (MPC)  out of wealth are always positive. 
The question  is now to determine  the sign of 
(C-6)  d {Z'[F(X)]}  =  Z"[F(Xt)]  F'(XM). 
dxt 
Taking  the derivative  of Z'(X) =  C'(X)IC(X)  and  dropping  arguments 
for clarity  gives 
(C-7)  z,,  C=  C-  C'C' 
C2 
Kimball's  work'07  established  that  for  utility  functions  that  exhibit  de- 
creasing  absolute  prudence  (as does the CRRA  utility  function  used by 
Zeldes'08  and the model in this paper) C"(X)  < 0; that is, the marginal 
propensity  to consume  declines  as gross  wealth  increases.  However, the 
107. Kimball  (1990a,b). 
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level of consumption  C is always positive, so Z"  must be always nega- 
tive. The remaining  question  is the sign of F'(X,). 
(C-8)  d- F(X,) =  d  [X, -  C(xt)  + H  = 1 -  C'(X,). 
dxt  dxt 
Because the MPC  out of wealth  will always  be less than  one, F'(Xt)  > 
0. Thus C-6 is negative, implying  C-5 is negative, implying  that dldxt 
A2  < 0. Thus,  wealthy  consumers  have a lower  variance  of consumption 
changes, and so a lower expected growth  rate of income. 
D.  Proof That If x, >  x*, Then E, xt+I <  xt 
In the text, I claim that if gross wealth x is greater  than the target 
value, then the expected value of gross wealth next period  will be less 
than  gross wealth  this period;  formally,  if xt >  x*, then  Et  xt+  I < x,. This 
section proves that  proposition  for the case with only transitory  shocks 
to income. Equation  B-2 above established  that 
xt+ I = R[xt -  ct(xt)]IG  Nt+ I +  Vt+  1, 
where  N is the shock to permanent  income and V is the shock to transi- 
tory income. If there are no shocks to permanent  income, N  1. If 
H(xt) = Et  xt+  1,  then, because V, by definition,  has a mean  of one, it is 
clear  that 
H(xt) = RIG [xt -  c(xt)] +  1. 
Because x* was defined as the point where Et xt+  I =  xt, H(x*)  =  x*. 
Now consider some x, in the vicinity of x*, xt = x* + ut. Taking  a first 
order  Taylor  expansion, 
H(xt) = H(x*)  +  H'(x*) ut = x* +  H'(x*) ut. 
So the question becomes  whether Et x,+I  =  x*  +  H'(x*) ut < x* + 
ut = xt-that  is, whether H'(x*) < 1. But 
-H(xt)  = RIG [1 -  c'(xt)]. 
dxt 
Kimball's  work'09  proved  that the marginal  propensity  to consume  is 
greater  under  uncertainty  than  under  certainty.  Using the usual  approxi- 
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mations,  the marginal  propensity  to consume  under  certainty  is given by 
[r -  p-l  (r -  8)], so that: 
H'(x)  = RIG [1 -  c' (x,)] < RIG [1 -  r +  p-  (r -  8)] 
-(1  +  r -  g) [1 -  r +  p  (r -  8)] 
So the question is now whether (1 +  r -  g) [1 -  r +  p-  (r -  <)]  < 
1. This condition  will hold as long as p-' (r -  8) < g. But because p is 
positive and (r -  8) is negative  for all parameter  combinations  consid- 
ered in the paper,  the left-hand  side of the inequality  is always negative, 
while g is always zero or positive. So, assuming  all the approximations 
hold, 
H'(x,) < (I  +  r -  g) [1-r  +  p -1 (r -  )]<  1 
which is the required  condition  to guarantee  that  if x, > x*, Et,  x,+I < x,. 
E.  Proof That If x, =  x*, Then E, A Ct+1  g 
In the text, I claim  that  if gross wealth  x, is at the target  ratio  x*, then 
the expected rate  of growth  of consumption  is approximately  equal  to g, 
the growth rate of income. I prove this, again, for the simplified  case 
where there  are no shocks to permanent  income. 
Recall that (again  using C for the level of consumption  and c for the 
ratio  of consumption  to permanent  income)  Ct = ct  Pt, where  P is perma- 
nent income. If there  are no shocks to permanent  income  P, it grows so 
that Pt+  1  =  G Pt. If ln (G) =  g,  then the expected  growth rate of con- 
sumption  is given by 
(E-1)  Et [In (Ct+1) -  ln (C)]  = Et{ln [c(xt+1)Pt+I] -  ln [c(xt)P,]} 
= Et [ln c(xt+1)] +  ln (G) +  ln (P,) 
-  ln c(xt) -  ln (P,), 
(E-2)  =  Et[lnc(xt+i)]  +  g  -  lnc(xt). 
Recall from section B of the appendix that x,+ I =  RIG [xt -  c(xt)] + 
V,+  I. Recall that the mean of V was  1, and define vt,+I -  V,+I -  1. Call 
F(xt) = Et x,+  I = RIG [xt -  c(xt)] +  1. Then define Z(x)  =  ln c(x) so that 
(E-3)  ln [c(x,+ 1)] = Z(x,+  1) = Z[F(xt) +  v,+  1]. 
A first-order  Taylor  expansion  of Z around  F(x) yields 
(E-4)  Z(x,+ I) ;  Z[F(xt)] + Z'[F(xt)] v,+  1. 134  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  2:1992 
The expected value of Z(x,+  I) yields Et  Z(x,+  I) -  Z[F(x,)].  Substitut- 
ing this for the first  term  in equation  E-2 yields 
(E-5)  Et [ln (C,+ I) -  ln (CQ)]  E  Et Z[F(x,)] + g  -  ln c(xt), 
lnc(Etxt+1)  +  g  -  lnc(xt). 
But at the target ratio, Et xt+I = xt, so the first and third  terms are 
equal, so 
(E-6)  Et [ln (Ct+  I) -  ln (CQ)]  -  g. 
That  is, at the target  gross wealth ratio, the expected growth  rate of 
consumption  is approximately  the same as the growth  rate  of income. 
F.  Proof That the Target Saving Ratio s* =  gw* 
In the text, I asserted  that if wealth is equal to its target  w*, the per- 
sonal  saving  rate  will be approximately  gw*. I will prove this  for the case 
in which there is no uncertainty  in permanent  income, Pt =  G Pt l,  or 
Pt  l  = PtIG. Personal  saving  is defined  as the difference  between total 
personal income (including  both capital and labor income) and con- 
sumption.  Capital  income in period t will be given by the interest  rate r 
multiplied  by the unconsumed  portion  of total period t -  1 resources, 
(Wt_  I +  YLt- I -  Ct, 1).  This leads to the definition  of saving: 
St=  r(Wt  -+  YLt-  t  - C1)  +  YLt -  Ct. 
Because by definition 
Wt =  R(Wt-I  +  YLt-I  -  Ct-1) 
it follows  that St =  (rIR) Wt +  YLt -  Ct.  "10 
The precise question  is the following. Suppose w, = w*. What  is the 
expected personal  saving  rate  in period  t, where expectations  are taken 
before the realization  of the period t shock (that is, expectations are 
taken  as of time  t-  1)?"' 
110. A more  familiar  version  of this  equation  would  be S, = rW,  + YL,  -  Ct.  The  equa- 
tion here differs  because, in my notation,  wealth  in period  t includes  the interest  income 
earned  on savings  from  period  t -  1. I made  this notational  choice because  it usually  sim- 
plifies  the algebra  of the model, but in this particular  case it leads to an equation  with a 
slightly  nonstandard  appearance. 
111. Note that  w,  is known  at time t -  1, because  wt = RIG  (w,_, + Vt  -  -  c, ,1),  so it 
makes  sense to consider  a case where  w,  is known  to equal  w*, even though  the values of 
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(F-1)  E,  st =  E,  (  W  +  YLt -  Ct)IEt_ I YLt 
= Et,_ (jw  P,  +  Vt  Pt -  ctPt)IEt  -I Vt  Pt 
= R w,+  1 -  Et_Ict 
(F-2)  EtIst  r(l  -  r)wt  +  1 -  Et_Ict. 
Now, noting  that  x, = w, + Vt,  from  equation  B-2, it follows that 
w,+  =  RIG (wt +  V, -  ct) 
Et-  wt+1 =  RIG (wt +  1 -  Et_  ct). 
Now  w* was defined so that at w, =  w*, it will be the case that E,_ 
w,+I =  w,=  w*. Substituting, it follows that: 
w*  =RIG(w*+I-Et1Ict) 
1 -EtIct  =  w*(GIR  -1) 
(F-3)  I1  E  -IE_ ct,--  w* (I  +  g  -  r -  rg  -  1)=w*  (g  -  r -  rg). 
Substituting  this expression  into equation  F-2 at wt_  I = w* yields 
Et-  Is*~  r (l-  r)w*  +  (g-  r -rg)  w* 
=rw*  -r2w*  +  gw*-rw*  -  rgw* 
=(r  -  r2 +  g  -  r-rg)  w*  -  gw*, 
where  the last near-equality  holds because r and  g are  both close to zero 
so that  r2 =  rg  =  0. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert  E. Hall: In this paper,  Carroll  provides  an impressive  review of 
the evidence on consumption  within  the framework  of optimization  the- 
ory. A basic point  of this and  his earlier  work  is that  optimization  theory 
can explain  features  of consumption  behavior  that  previously  seemed to 
require  theories of nonoptimal  behavior.  Rather  than  invoke inefficient 
liquidity  constraints,  Carroll  argues,  it is better  to look closely at optimal 
behavior  for  individuals  who are  trying  to avoid  the catastrophe  of close- 
to-zero consumption.  Further,  Carroll  states, what may have appeared 
to be spontaneous  shifts of consumption  and saving  may actually  be the 
rational  response by consumers  to changes in their stochastic environ- 
ments. 
An interesting  feature of the paper is that it builds upon the same 
model  of consumption  that  has dominated  thinking  in this area  since the 
rational  expectations revolution. Rather than advocate a new model, 
Carroll  asks us to take seriously  the nonlinearities  in the existing  model. 
He sees the majority  of consumers  as accumulating  a buffer  stock of net 
worth to guard  against  the small probability  of earnings  dropping  to a 
level that would support  only extremely low consumption. Once the 
buffer  stock is in place, consumption  has the same  expected growth  rate 
as income, contrary  to, say, the certainty  equivalence  model. In the lat- 
ter, only the present  discounted  value  of earnings  over the entire  lifetime 
matters  for consumption;  spending  does not respond at all to year-to- 
year  changes  in income, unless they signal  changes  in the entire  present 
discounted  value. 
Households  will not be in the buffer-stock  mode unless they meet the 
following  conditions.  First, they must  abhor  low levels of consumption: 
utility must go to minus  infinity  as consumption  goes to zero. The con- 
stant-elasticity  family, including  log utility, has this property, but not 
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quadratic  utility. Second, the rate  of impatience  must  be high  relative  to 
the real interest  rate or the rate of growth  of income must be high. The 
precise condition  is that the rate of impatience  must  be greater  than  the 
real  interest  rate  less the product  of the rate  of growth  of income  and  the 
coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion. When  this condition  is satisfied,  the 
household  with quadratic  preferences  would go substantially  into debt. 
By contrast, the household that puts high value on avoiding very low 
levels of consumption  would not go into debt. 
The difference  between the two types of preferences  in general  equi- 
librium  is shown in figure  1, which portrays  the supply  and demand  for 
capital  as functions  of the real interest  rate. The demand  schedule  is the 
marginal  product  of capital, net of depreciation.  The supply  schedule  is 
the level of wealth  that  consumers  will choose to hold  in the steady state 
at a given interest  rate. The upward-sloping  curve describes  the behav- 
ior of families with the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)  prefer- 
ences hypothesized  by Carroll.  As the real interest  rate  approaches  the 
critical value, the wealth held by consumers approaches  infinity. But 
even at low interest  rates, families  hold positive amounts  of wealth be- 138  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
cause of the buffer-stock motive. The horizontal dashed line is the 
wealth supply  curve for families  with quadratic  preferences.  Their  sup- 
ply is perfectly  elastic at the critical  interest  rate. They would  go indefi- 
nitely into debt if the interest  rate  were lower than  the critical  level. 
From  the figure,  it is immediately  apparent  that  the buffer-stock  econ- 
omy will have a higher  capital stock and a lower real interest rate than 
the certainty-equivalence  economy. 
Carroll  builds  the model in both of the ways prevalent  in the modern 
literature  on consumption.  First  is the structural  consumption  function, 
which shows how families  choose consumption  given its determinants. 
Second is the Euler equation,  which relates next year's expected mar- 
ginal  utility  of consumption  to this year's, based  on the principle  that  the 
expected marginal  rate of substitution  should equal the expected price 
ratio. Carroll's  structural  consumption  function  must be calculated  nu- 
merically  to do full  justice to the nonlinearities  stressed  in his approach. 
The calculations  confirm  that consumption  and saving depend on net 
worth  in such a way that  there  is a target  ratio  of net worth  to permanent 
income. 
Carroll's  Euler  equation  (equation  5) shows that  consumption  growth 
depends on the two factors stressed in the Euler branch  of the litera- 
ture-the  real interest rate, and the unpredictable  random  increment 
embodying  the effect on consumption  of all new information-plus a 
factor implicit  in earlier  work. The third  factor is the conditional  vari- 
ance of next year's consumption,  given information  available  this year. 
Variations  over time in the conditional  variance  have been an important 
topic in the applications  of the Euler equation in finance.' Carroll  ap- 
pears  to be the pioneer  in making  the conditional  variance  an active part 
of the Euler  equation  in the study  of consumption. 
Carroll  observes that  an increase  in uncertainty  will trigger  an imme- 
diate drop  in consumption.  In the structural  consumption  function, the 
amount  of uncertainty  is one of the determinants  of the function;  more 
uncertainty  brings  a downward  shift. In the Euler  equation,  more  uncer- 
tainty  shows up as a negative  value  of the random  disturbance  term.  Fol- 
lowing the immediate drop, consumption  growth rises; consumption 
eventually returns  to its previous level, with consumers holding more 
wealth. In the structural  consumption  function, it is rising  wealth that 
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causes higher  consumption  as time passes. In the Euler equation, it is 
the higher  conditional  variance  of consumption  that brings  higher  con- 
sumption  growth. As the buffer stock of wealth rises, the conditional 
variance  falls back and  the extra  consumption  growth  comes to an end. 
Having isolated the effects of changing  income uncertainty  on con- 
sumption  with  greater  specificity  than  in previous  work, Carroll  turns  to 
the task of finding  an observable measure  of uncertainty.  He chooses 
unemployment.  His logic is that  low-probability  episodes of dramatic  in- 
come loss are  the most  important  kind  of uncertainty  and  that  unemploy- 
ment is the reason for most such episodes. He makes the implicit as- 
sumption  that periods of higher or rising unemployment  are periods 
when the probability  of large  income losses from  joblessness rises. The 
relation  between  aggregate  unemployment  and  income  volatility  is more 
complicated.  In a contraction,  rates of job loss rise dramatically.  How- 
ever, when unemployment  stops rising, unemployment  typically re- 
mains  elevated  for several  years. In fact, this appears  to be the situation 
in the U.S. labor  market  since the middle  of 1991.  When  unemployment 
is high  but not rising,  the rate  ofjob loss is at roughly  normal  levels. The 
typical  episode  ofjoblessness lasts longer,  however, because  job-finding 
rates  are lower in slack markets. 
It is an interesting  question whether a direct attack on the buffer- 
stock hypothesis could be made using microeconomic  panel data. Car- 
roll  comments  skeptically  on the interesting  attempt  by Karen  Dynan  to 
estimate an Euler equation with explicit treatment  of the conditional 
variance  of log consumption  growth.2  Her results lend little support  to 
the buffer-stock  hypothesis. I am not aware  of any attempts  to estimate 
structural  consumption  functions in microeconomic  data with explicit 
uncertainty.  It is possible that microeconomic  panel data  could be used 
to estimate the conditional  distribution  of future earnings  and then to 
show that  the dispersion  of that  distribution  shifts  the consumption  func- 
tion downward, as the buffer-stock hypothesis holds. In particular, 
panel  data  may  make  it possible to see directly  how uncertainty  changes 
from  booms to recessions. 
Carroll's  applications  of the model to consumption-saving  puzzles 
are uniformly  interesting,  but not all are convincing.  I found  the discus- 
sion of the parallel  behavior  of consumption  and  income  confusing.  The 
2. Dynan  (1991). 140  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
joint behavior  of consumption  and  income  is the result  of random  shocks 
influencing  both  variables.  The statement  that  the growth  rate  of income 
does not enter anywhere  in the Euler  equation  misses the point. A ran- 
dom event that affects both income and consumption  will have effects 
on all three  terms  in the Euler  equation:  the real  interest  rate, the condi- 
tional variance  of future consumption,  and the random  increment.  To 
decide if the parallel  behavior  of income and consumption  is consistent 
with a particular  theory, it is necessary to trace through  the effects of 
an outside shock on the two variables  to see whether  they should  move 
together  for that type of shock. Carroll  makes this kind of analysis for 
the buffer-stock  regime,  but  he does not make  a comparable  analysis  for 
the standard  life-cycle regime. I do not think that he can reach a clear 
conclusion  that  parallel  movements  of consumption  and  income  support 
the buffer-stock  case over the standard  case. Only  a full general  equilib- 
rium  analysis could resolve this question, but that analysis is way be- 
yond the scope of this paper. 
Carroll  tackles the key question of the decline in consumption  that 
occurs in recessions. His empirical  results confirm  that times when un- 
employment  is high  or rising  are times when saving  is higher  than  usual. 
Although  Carroll  is careful  to consider  the possibility  that  causality  runs 
from higher  saving to higher  unemployment,  rather  than  the other way 
around,  I am not as persuaded  as he is that  the evidence favors  causality 
from  unemployment  to saving.  I find  nothing  to commend  his identifying 
hypothesis that changes in preferences related to saving are uncorre- 
lated  with events in the economy six months  earlier.  To me, it is an open 
issue whether the story of the typical recession runs the way Carroll 
wants to tell it: some force depresses aggregate  activity, raises unem- 
ployment,  and  thus raises income  volatility, so consumption  declines in 
relation  to permanent  income, thus worsening  the recession. Although 
I see it as an open question whether Carroll's  hypothesis is correct, I 
think  the hypothesis  deserves to be taken  very seriously. 
Carroll  uses the buffer-stock  hypothesis  to explain  at least part  of the 
puzzle of low saving  in the 1980s.  Relaxation  of borrowing  constraints, 
improved  credit  reporting,  and more  widespread  health  and unemploy- 
ment insurance are influences that depress saving in a buffer-stock 
world, but not in a life-cycle certainty-equivalence  world. Carroll  here 
offers an intellectually  attractive  alternative  to the view that there was 
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Carroll's  paper is an important  advance in consumption  economics 
even after  a decade  of intense  research.  The paper  also shows that  much 
more  remains  to be done. 
Stephen  P. Zeldes: I will begin  by describing  how this paper  fits into the 
existing literature  on consumption  and saving. Then I will briefly  sum- 
marize  what I think  are the paper's main  points. Finally, I will discuss 
some of the pitfalls  and  problems  with Christopher  Carroll's  approach. 
In recent years, there have been two main  branches  of the literature 
on consumption  and saving. The first  is what I will call the certainty  or 
certainty  equivalence  (CEQ)  approach;  the second is the Euler  equation 
approach.  Let me describe  each briefly. 
Virtually  all the work that has examined the optimal level of con- 
sumption  and saving as a function of different  variables  has assumed 
either  that labor  income is variable,  but nonstochastic,  or has assumed 
quadratic  preferences (so that consumption  in the presence of uncer- 
tainty  about  labor  income  is identical  to what  it would  be if labor  income 
were set equal  to its mean).  The basic result  is that  optimal  consumption 
is based on expected lifetime resources, calculated  by adding  financial 
wealth  to the present  value of expected future  income. Consumption  is 
set equal  to the annuity  value (possibly  allowing  for growth)  of this sum- 
mary  statistic.  The CEQ  model  is standard  in almost  all the literature  on 
the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) and permanent income hypothesis 
(PIH)  that examines  the level of consumption,  and is the basis of virtu- 
ally all of our  intuition  about  consumption. 
The second approach  in the consumption  literature  has been the Eu- 
ler equation  approach,  following  the work  of Robert  Hall  and  many  oth- 
ers.I This approach  has focused on the expected growth rate of con- 
sumption,  rather  than on the level. The key result is that consumption 
growth  should  be orthogonal  to lagged  information.  This approach  typi- 
cally assumes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)  preferences, al- 
though  sometimes  quadratic  utility  is assumed.2  This approach  has con- 
tributed  substantially  to our intuition  about  the expected growth  rate of 
1. Hall  (1978). 
2. Some recent  work  uses preferences  that  allow  for a risk  aversion  parameter  that  is 
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consumption,  but has not contributed  to our intuition  about  the level of 
consumption. 
Carroll's  paper is part of a literature  that combines parts of each of 
these approaches.  This literature  looks at the level of consumption  and 
saving  in the presence  of random  labor  income  and  imperfect  insurance, 
but uses preferences  such as CRRA  that are not immune  to the effects 
of this income uncertainty.  These preferences  exhibit  what Miles Kim- 
ball has termed "prudence":  a positive third derivative of the utility 
function.3  These preferences  generate  a difference  between what saving 
would be under  certainty,  with income set equal to its mean, and what 
saving  is under  uncertainty,  a difference  Hayne E. Leland  dubbed  "pre- 
cautionary  saving."4  Leland and Kimball, as well as Agnar Sandmo, 
Truman  Bewley, Jack Schechtman, Vera L.S. Escudero, and others, 
have been able to derive some properties  of the solution analytically.' 
Unfortunately,  however, no one has been able  to solve this optimal  con- 
sumption  problem  analytically,  so until  recently  economists  were stuck. 
The advent  of high-speed  computers,  however, has broken  new ground 
on this problem.  For example,  in my 1989  paper,  I applied  some existing 
numerical  dynamic  programming  techniques to the optimal  consump- 
tion problem  and examined the resulting  numerical  solution.6  I calcu- 
lated  the level of consumption  as a function  of wealth, the marginal  pro- 
pensity  to  consume out  of  wealth,  and the  expected  growth of 
consumption  over time as a function  of initial  wealth. 
What  has emerged  from  the papers  mentioned  above, and  from  work 
by Jonathan  Skinner  and Angus Deaton, as well as a number  of papers 
in the consumption-based  asset pricing  literature,  is a somewhat  new in- 
tuition  about optimal  consumption  under  uncertainty.7  Although  some 
of the intuition  of the CEQ  remains  in these models, some surprising  dif- 
ferences arise  between  consumption  under  uncertainty  and  under  CEQ. 
First, at any given wealth  and  income  level, the level of consumption 
is lower (and thus saving is higher)  under uncertainty  than under cer- 
tainty  with income set to its mean. Second, at any given wealth and in- 
come level, the marginal  propensity  to consume out of wealth is higher 
3. Kimball  (1990a). 
4.  Leland  (1968). 
5. Sandmo  (1970);  Bewley (1977);  Schechtman  and  Escudero  (1977). 
6. Zeldes(1989a). 
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under  uncertainty.  While  the result about the level of consumption  de- 
pends on a positive third derivative of the utility function, the result 
about the marginal  propensity to  consume depends on derivatives 
higher  than  the third. 
Third, the expected growth in consumption  is higher under uncer- 
tainty. Fourth,  all three of the above effects are stronger,  the lower the 
level of financial  wealth. Finally, the expected growth  in consumption 
depends  on the conditional  variance  of consumption  growth.8 
This brings  us to Carroll's  earlier  work,9  some of which he reviews 
in this paper. One of the main  results is that consumption  more closely 
parallels  income under  uncertainty  than  under  certainty. 
Carroll  examines both permanent  and transitory  differences in in- 
come growth. For comparisons of permanent  differences over some 
range  of growth  rates, the model  works similarly  to a model  with liquid- 
ity constraints.  Given the rate of time preference,  the interest  rate, and 
the coefficient  of relative risk aversion, if the income profile  starts out 
steep enough,  then steepening  it further  will cause the consumption  pro- 
file to steepen; that is, wealth falls, causing expected consumption 
growth to rise. Carroll  stresses this result in his other 1992 paper. I 
should  point  out that  over lower  ranges  of the growth  in income, this  par- 
allel breaks down; reducing  the growth in income will cause the con- 
sumer  to save more, but this will have only a small  effect on the growth 
of consumption.  Thus  the consumption/income  parallel  occurs, but  only 
over certain  ranges  of income  growth. 
Carroll  also argues  that a consumption/income  parallel  will occur for 
short-term  fluctuations.  This  result  builds  on two existing  ones. The  first 
is the observation-made  by many-that  the conditiondl  variance of 
consumption  growth enters as a separate  term in the linearized  Euler 
equation.  (This term is often assumed  to be a constant in the empirical 
Euler equation  consumption  literature,  although  this is not the case in 
the consumption-based  asset pricing  literature.)  The second is the result 
in my 1989  paper that the expected growth of consumption  is signifi- 
cantly  higher  at low levels of wealth  than  at high  levels of wealth. Carroll 
argues  that  low draws  of income will lead to lower levels of wealth, and 
8. Engen  (1992)  adds  that  the interest  elasticity  of saving  can be much  smaller  in a pre- 
cautionary  saving  model  than  in a certainty  equivalence  model. 
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that this leads to a higher  conditional  variance  of consumption  growth 
and higher  mean consumption  growth. This introduces  the possibility 
that consumption  can more closely track income in the short run, and 
that  the commonly  found  violation  of the linearized  version  of the Euler 
equation  is due to this changing  conditional  variance.  This is an intrigu- 
ing  theoretical  possibility;  the degree  to which it is important  in practice 
is still a wide-open  question. 
Deaton and then Carroll  have also examined the implications  for 
wealth  accumulation  over time.'0  They have argued  that in order  to ex- 
plain  the relatively  low wealth  holdings  of a large  fraction  of the popula- 
tion, it is necessary  to assume  that  individuals  have a relatively  high  rate 
of time  preference  or a high  growth  of income. In the model  with CRRA 
preferences,  a simple  income  process, and  an infinite  horizon,  there is a 
single-state  variable:  the ratio  of wealth  to the permanent  component  of 
income. Because of the single-state variable property of the model, 
Deaton and Carroll  have called the model with the higher  rate of time 
preference  a "buffer-stock  model"  of saving. Below some level of the 
single-state  variable, the precautionary  motive dominates and people 
accumulate  wealth, on average. Above that level, the high rate of time 
preference  dominates  and  people run  down their  wealth, on average. It 
is worth  emphasizing  that  this buffer-stock  model  is a standard  model  of 
intertemporal  consumer  optimization  under  uncertainty,  with  a parame- 
terization  such that consumers  would want to borrow  in the absence of 
uncertainty. 
After deriving  analytic  and numerical  results, the next step is to see 
whether precautionary  saving is important  in practice, and whether a 
model  with precautionary  saving  can explain  empirical  phenomena  that 
are  puzzling  from  the point  of view of a CEQ  model. There  are  two ways 
of doing this: the first  uses numerical  methods, simulation,  and/or  cali- 
bration  to see whether  an appropriately  parameterized  model  can match 
certain stylized facts about the world. The second approach  is to per- 
form empirical  estimation  and test directly  for the presence of precau- 
tionary  effects. A number  of very recent  papers  do this, including  Karen 
Dynan's."I  The current  Carroll  paper uses both these approaches;  the 
numerical  work guides the empirical  work. It examines the effects of 
10. Deaton  (1991);  Carroll  (1992). 
11. Dynan(1991). Christopher D.  Carroll  145 
changes in expected income growth, as well as changes in uncertainty 
about  future  income. A main  result  is that  small  changes  in the probabil- 
ity of extremely  low realizations  of income can have significant  effects 
on precautionary  saving. Carroll  interprets  these low realizations  of in- 
come as spells of unemployment. 
I have only one comment on the specifics of the numerical  results. 
The comparative  statics exercises done in the paper  are suggestive, but 
do not completely correspond  to the types of changes households  face 
in the world.  For example,  consider  the effects of a change  in the growth 
rate  of income  or a permanent  change  in uncertainty.  The  paper  assumes 
that individuals  have always faced-and  always will face-that  same 
growth rate or that same uncertainty. The paper then changes the 
growth  rate or uncertainty  and examines the dynamic  effects. That is, 
people face a change  to which they had ex-ante assigned  zero probabil- 
ity. While  this approach  used to be a commonly  performed  comparative 
statics exercise, it is an inappropriate  experiment  to perform.  It is espe- 
cially problematic  here, where the whole point of the exercise is that 
people are  forward-looking  and  take into account  all  possible contingent 
outcomes. The correct way to do the calculations  (which, granted, is 
very difficult)  is to let people face a probability  distribution  for future 
income  growth  and  possibly for uncertainty,  and  then examine  the opti- 
mal  response  to various  realizations.  This is an important  area  for  future 
research. 
Let me now turn  to the empirical  work. The goal of Carroll's  paper  is 
to examine  the empirical  effects of an economy-wide  change in the de- 
gree of uncertainty  facing  individuals.  Much  of what is new in the paper 
is the direct  empirical  work, and  in particular  the idea of using  the unem- 
ployment  rate (or a proxy of it) as a measure  of this uncertainty.  Carroll 
claims that a high (or rising)  unemployment  rate corresponds  to a high 
level of income uncertainty.  His empirical  work examines  the relation- 
ship  between  the saving  rate  or consumption  growth  and  a proxy  for un- 
-employment  expectations. 
Let me briefly  describe  the variables  used in the empirical  work. The 
paper  uses answers  to survey questions  about  saving, changes  in aggre- 
gate unemployment,  and changes in individual  income. It is worth re- 
viewing  exactly what  these questions  are. 
The saving question asks: "If there were a major  purchase  that you 
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use some of your  savings,  or is now a time  when you would  be especially 
reluctant  to use some of your savings?"  Carroll  constructs a measure 
(SA  V) equal  to the fraction  of the people who answered  that  they would 
be reluctant  minus  the fraction  who answered  that  it would be okay. 
I have two comments  about  this variable.  First, because it refers  to a 
"major  purchase,"  it is clearly asking  about durables.  However, all the 
theory in the paper is about nondurables  and services. There are un- 
doubtedly  important  links  between  uncertainty,  illiquidity,  and  durables 
expenditures  (some of which have been modeled in other recent pa- 
pers),'2  but they are not modeled or carefully  discussed in this paper. 
This makes me question  the validity  of the mapping  from  the theory to 
the empirical  work. 
Second, I can not tell from  this question  what the suggested  alterna- 
tive is. If respondents  answer  that they would be reluctant  to use some 
of their  savings  now, does that  mean  that  they would  be unlikely  to make 
the major  purchase  or that  will they find  the money elsewhere (by using 
current  income or cutting  other  expenditures)  and  purchase  it anyway? 
It is not clear  what  this question  reveals. 
Another question is about unemployment  changes. It asks: "How 
about  people out of work  during  the next 12  months-do  you think  that 
there will be more unemployment  than now, about the same, or less?" 
Again, Carroll  uses a constructed  variable  (MU): the fraction  of house- 
holds who believe unemployment  will increase minus  the fraction  who 
believe it will decrease. I also have two comments  about this variable. 
First, it is about  the change  in unemployment,  not the level. Second, it 
measures  how much of a consensus exists about the change in unem- 
ployment,  not the amount  that  unemployment  is expected to rise. Thus 
if a large  fraction  of the population  anticipates  a very small  rise in unem- 
ployment, MU will be very high, even though the expected change in 
unemployment  may be very low. Calling the variable the "expected 
change  in unemployment"  is therefore  misleading. 
Yet another  question has to do with the change in income. It asks: 
"[In]  the next year or two, do you expect that your (family)  income will 
go up more  than  prices  will go up, or less than  prices  will go up?"  Carroll 
uses the constructed  variable  (MY): the fraction  of households  who be- 
lieve their real household income will increase minus the fraction  who 
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believe it will decrease. This variable  has the same problem  as MU: it 
does not capture  the degree to which income is expected to rise, but 
rather  measures  the fraction  of people who expect their  income to rise. 
Also note-and  this is what is intended-that  this question is asking 
about  individual  income, while the previous question  was asking  about 
aggregate  unemployment. 
I will focus on four  sets of tests and  results:  those of tables  5, 6, 7, and 
9. I will first  summarize  the intuition  behind  the tests and the results in 
all four  tables, and  then comment  on them. 
The first  part  of table  5 regresses  the first  variable  described,  SAV, on 
the two expectations  variables,  MU and MY. The idea is as follows: if 
MU is high, lots of people expect unemployment  to rise, so that uncer- 
tainty about who will become unemployed  is high, which means that 
precautionary  saving is high; therefore  now is a bad time to buy. This 
suggests  a positive coefficient  on MU, and  Carroll  does find  a significant 
positive coefficient. 
Table  6 regresses  the personal  saving  rate  on MU, MY,  and  the unem- 
ployment rate, using quarterly  data and (in some cases) instrumental 
variables.  The idea is similar  to the test in table  5, except here the actual 
saving  rate, s, is used rather  than  the survey  variable  SA  V, and  the level 
of unemployment  is included as well. An expected increase in unem- 
ployment  should  correspond  to high  uncertainty  and, thus, to a high  sav- 
ing  rate. The empirical  results  are mixed, but, in some cases, MU enters 
with the correct sign, and in others the unemployment  rate itself enters 
with a positive sign. 
Table  7 reports  a regression  like the ones run  by John  Campbell  and 
N. Gregory  Mankiw.'3  The change in consumption  is regressed  on the 
(instrumented)  actual  change  in income and  MU. The test is as follows: 
once MU is included  as a regressor,  is there  any remaining  evidence that 
some households  follow rule-of-thumb  behavior  of consuming  their in- 
come in every period?  If so, then after  allowing  for some rule-of-thumb 
consumers, does MU help predict  consumption  growth?  The standard 
theory  of precautionary  saving  implies  that  MU should  enter  with  a posi- 
tive sign: higher  MU implies higher  uncertainty,  which implies  a faster 
expected growth of consumption.  Carroll  finds that including  MU de- 
creases the sign  of the coefficient  on the growth  in income, but  it remains 
13. Campbell  and  Mankiw  (1989). 148  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1992 
significantly  greater  than  zero. He also finds  that  MU does seem to have 
a separate  role, and enters  the equation  significantly;  unfortunately,  the 
sign of the coefficient  is negative rather  than positive. So, Carroll  says 
that  in order  to reconcile  this finding  with the theory, the theory  must  be 
augmented  in one of two ways: by adding  habit  formation  or adjustment 
costs for consumption. 
Finally, in table 9, Carroll  takes up the current  recovery. He exam- 
ines the consumption  growth  forecast errors  from  the table 7 equations 
(the Campbell/Mankiw  model with and without MU)  for the period 
since the 1990:3  business cycle peak, and also for the period since his 
estimate (1991:2)  of the business cycle trough. He finds that there is 
slightly  less underprediction  of the growth  of consumption  when MU is 
included  than when it is not. His interpretation  is that high  uncertainty 
has generated  low consumption  growth  in the current  recovery. 
Let me comment  on these tests and  results. Overall,  I find  the empiri- 
cal results intriguing  and suggestive, but they do not constitute strong 
evidence supporting  the theory. A large  gap between theoretical  results 
and the empirical  tests often exists that requires  a leap of faith on the 
part  of the reader.  Carroll  provides only a sketch of how the empirical 
tests might  follow from the theory; much more work is needed to pro- 
vide the bridge  and  the road  map  between the two. 
The other main  difficulty  that I have with the empirical  implementa- 
tion is that I am not convinced that the survey variable  MU is a good 
proxy for future  income uncertainty.  Two links must be made  to justify 
MU as a good proxy. One is the link from  MU to expected changes in 
unemployment.  The other is the link from expected changes in unem- 
ployment to uncertainty. I have already discussed my reservations 
about  the MU variable  as a proxy  for the expected change  in unemploy- 
ment. As far as the second link, Carroll  does not make it clear whether 
income  uncertainty  is high  when the expected change in unemployment 
is high or when the expected level of unemployment  is high: that is, is 
uncertainty  higher  if unemployment  is expected to rise from  6 to 8 per- 
cent next period or if unemployment  is expected to stay constant at 
10  percent?  Much  of the discussion  in the paper  is about  the level of un- 
employment,  but MU seems to be serving  as a proxy for the expected 
change  in unemployment.  Presumably,  whether  it is expected levels or 
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dynamics  of unemployment  at the household  level: how does an individ- 
ual's probability  of job loss change with the aggregate  unemployment 
rate?  Unfortunately,  the paper  does not include  a discussion of, or evi- 
dence about, labor market  dynamics. Direct evidence on the relation- 
ship between the aggregate  unemployment  rate and the probability  and 
duration  of individual  spells of unemployment  should be a key goal of 
future  research  in this area. 
Finally,  the MU variable  could easily be a proxy, in my mind,  for the 
mean  of expected future  income, rather  than the variance.  Carroll  tries 
to adjust  for this by including  the MYvariable  in the regressions,  arguing 
that  MY  captures  the expected change  in income, and  any additional  in- 
formation  in  MU must  be about  other  moments  of the distribution.  How- 
ever, because MY is the fraction  of the population  expecting increases 
in income, rather  than the actual expected income itself, it seems un- 
likely that it is fully capturing  the expected change  in income. If a large 
fraction  of the population  believes unemployment  will  be rising,  this cor- 
responds  to an expected drop in the mean of future  income. The stan- 
dard  certainty  equivalence  model (with  no precautionary  saving)  would 
predict  a high saving rate. Therefore  I am not convinced that the tests 
are capturing  a precautionary  saving effect, rather  than an effect that 
would arise in a standard  certainty  equivalence  permanent  income/life- 
cycle model. 
Thus while the evidence linking  saving  to MU is suggestive  that pre- 
cautionary  saving may be important,  more work (both theoretical  and 
directly  empirical)  is needed  to show that  MU is indeed  capturing  house- 
hold uncertainty  about  future  income. This paper  is likely to stimulate 
further  research  in this area. 
In conclusion,  I think  that  this paper  contributes  to the growing  litera- 
ture on the effects of uncertainty on optimal saving and consump- 
tion, and in particular  draws out many of the macroeconomic  implica- 
tions of the theory. Some of the numerical  exercises help change our 
intuition  about saving under uncertainty.  The most innovative part of 
the paper  is the idea of using MU as an empirical  proxy for individual- 
level uncertainty  about income. I find the empirical  results intriguing 
and, on the whole, intuitively  appealing.  However, I am not fully con- 
vinced that they actually  provide support  for this precautionary  saving 
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General Discussion 
Olivier  Blanchard  noted that the common empirical  finding  of a low 
interest  elasticity of saving  is consistent with the paper's  result  that the 
target  wealth ratio is unlikely  to be sensitive to changes in the interest 
rate. However, Alan Blinder noted that interest rates could have im- 
portant  wealth effects that would affect saving in the model. If interest 
rates  rise, wealth  is reduced;  this, according  to the model,  raises  the con- 
ditional  variance  of consumption  and  consumption  growth.  In response, 
consumers would lower current  consumption  and increase saving. In 
this vein, Richard  Cooper asked whether  the increase in wealth in the 
1980s  could be a reason  for the lower saving  rate of that  period. Carroll 
noted  that  a large  fraction  of personal  wealth  is held  by the very wealthy, 
people to whom he does not claim  his model applies. He further  argued 
that macroeconomic  models of consumption  which explicitly incorpo- 
rate  an effect of wealth  on the saving  rate  are unable  to explain  the mag- 
nitude  of the decline  in the saving  rate, so the wealth  effect cannot  be the 
only explanation  for the decline in saving. 
Christopher  Sims observed that using models of this type to explain 
the business  cycle is risky  unless they are  embedded  in a general  equilib- 
rium  framework.  Interest rates and income growth are not exogenous 
as assumed in the model. Sims noted, for example, that neoclassical 
growth  models  can alter  standard  consumption  growth  results  which  as- 
sume an exogenous constant  interest  rate. 
Blinder  observed  that  the model  also suggests  that  a widening  dispar- 
ity in incomes may affect saving. Increasing  inequality  of income and 
wealth is likely to involve an increase  in the probability  that some con- 
sumers  might  have zero incomes. Because buffer-stock  saving is espe- 
cially sensitive to the risk of very low incomes, the model predicts  that 
growing  inequality  would lead to lower aggregate  consumption  levels. 
Blanchard  noted  that  the model as specified  does not capture  the life- 
cycle motivation  of saving for retirement;  income is expected to grow 
over the lifetime and, indeed, is assumed to continue growing until 
death. In real  life, consumers  must  increase  their  target  wealth  ratio  be- 
fore they retire  to provide  for retirement.  He suggested  interpreting  the 
model as part  of a two-track  saving  process in which individuals  make 
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made  such commitments  to cover major  saving  for retirement,  then  they 
may behave according  to the buffer-stock  model with the remainder  of 
their incomes. He suggested a possible rationale  for this sort of two- 
track saving behavior:  nonexponential  discounting  by consumers that 
reflected  high  levels of impatience  in the short run, but less impatience 
over the longer  run. Carroll  acknowledged  that  the version  of his model 
with constant  income  growth  until  death  does not provide  a role  for life- 
cycle saving. He added that if the model is modified  so that incomes 
grow rapidly  during  the early part  of the life cycle and then turn  down, 
his model would predict  buffer-stock  saving early in the life cycle; but 
that  later  in life, as life-cycle considerations  dominate,  buffer-stock  con- 
siderations  would  fade. 
Gregory  Mankiw  was skeptical  that the precautionary  saving effects 
predicted  by the model could be seen in the data. He noted that recent 
research  by Dynan  (1991)  using  panel  data  finds  little evidence of a cor- 
relation  between consumption  growth  and  the variance  of consumption. 
But he also suggested  how this finding  might  not be inconsistent  with the 
model: people may self-select into occupations that have different  in- 
come risks, on the basis of their  degree  of risk aversion.  This self-selec- 
tion process would obscure  the evidence of the effects predicted  by the 
model  in panel  data. 
Julio  Rotemberg  cautioned  against  interpreting  the estimates  from  ag- 
gregate Euler equations  in terms of the characteristics  governing  indi- 
vidual  behavior  in the model. As aggregate  unemployment  varied  cycli- 
cally, the probability  of becoming  unemployed  would vary in different 
ways for different  individuals.  For many, the risk of job loss would not 
change  perceptibly  while for others  it would change  dramatically. 
Robert  Gordon  distinguished  between  two descriptions  of the current 
recession: the popular  account of a "hangover  recession" and the ac- 
count  proposed  by the model. On  the first  description,  one of the current 
"hangovers"  stems from an excessive increase in debt by households 
and  firms  during  the 1980s,  which must now be serviced  and  retired.  By 
contrast,  the Carroll  model  could  imply  that  no hangover  exists because 
greater  indebtedness  resulted  from an equilibrium  adjustment  by con- 
sumers to loosened borrowing  constraints.  Carroll  responded  that the 
"hangover"  description  of the current  recession could still be accurate 
because  an increase  in uncertainty  could  raise  consumers'  desired  target 
wealth, making  them uncomfortable  holding  debts that were viewed as 152  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1992 
tolerable  when times were better. He pointed  out that, in this interpreta- 
tion, the increase in unemployment  expectations is what converted an 
acceptable debt burden  in 1989 into a debt "hangover"  in 1991. Sims 
cited reductions in the penalties for personal bankruptcy  during the 
1980s  as another  equilibrium  explanation  for consumers'  greater  willing- 
ness to borrow. 
Martin  Baily related the model to inventory  theories of the firm. If 
firms, like Carroll's  consumers, are concerned about low-probability 
but  disastrous  events such as bankruptcy,  then  the use of inventories  for 
production  smoothing  may not occur over the business cycle. Rather, 
firms  would  run  down inventories  as the economy enters  recession-as 
is in fact observed. However, Baily cautioned  that people often do not 
behave rationally in planning for low-probability  disastrous events, 
citing the apparently  irrational  behavior in the market for flood or 
earthquake  insurance.  Such irrational  behavior  would weaken the link 
between current  consumption  and the probability  of future  unemploy- 
ment. Carroll  noted the ample research  into this type of behavior. His 
impression  of the literature  was that  people  planned  incorrectly,  not that 
they failed to plan altogether.  Thus, he argued, a link between unem- 
ployment  expectations  and  consumption  may  exist, even if those expec- 
tations  do not reflect  an optimal  forecast  of unemployment. 
Drawing  an analogy  to physics, William  Nordhaus  noted  that,  like the 
physical anomalies  that appear  at low temperatures,  strange  behavior 
which  the  model  does  not  capture  occurs  at  the  low  end  ofthe  income  scale  . 
He cited several examples of consumers  whose behavior  is not easily 
explained  by the buffer-stock  model: students, welfare recipients, and 
business people who go on a spending spree as personal bankruptcy 
looms. Baily  argued  for the importance  of contagion  effects: consumers, 
in  their  spending  patterns,  may  be influenced  by the  attitudes  and  behavior 
of their  reference  group.  When  the  prevailing  consumer  mood  is generally 
depressed  duringarecession,  consumers  may  spendless, regardless  ofthe 
true  expectation  of their  own future  incomes. Carroll  acknowledged  the 
possibility  of contagion  effects, and suggested  that beliefs about  the in- 
creased risk of unemployment  may be important  for explaining  con- 
sumption  even if economists have trouble  detecting  the marginal  effect 
of increased  unemployment  on the conditional  distribution  of income. 
He argued  that consumers  should act on the basis of their own beliefs, 
whether or not those beliefs can be shown to be optimal  forecasts. Christopher D.  Carroll  153 
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